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I. INTRODUCTION
Punishing prior offenders more severely than first offenders is a
principle that legislatures in this country have endorsed with unique
1
enthusiasm. Statutes instruct judges to use criminal history when
selecting an appropriate sentence from within the range designated for
2
3
an offense and regularly increase the range of punishment for prior
offenders beyond what would be permissible for defendants with clean
4
records. This Essay argues that statutes that increase penalties for
repeat offenders too often fail to accomplish their intended purposes
and that the procedures used to impose such sentences are
5
constitutionally suspect.
1. JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING
COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 2–3 (2008) (“[C]riminal record is more
important than any other aggravating or mitigating factor.”); id. at 12, 116 (comparing
sentencing law in several other countries where prior offenses lead to much smaller increases
in punishment); Michael Tonry, Race, Ethnicity, and Punishment, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 53, 77 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz
eds., 2012) (noting that unlike most countries that increase sentences for new crimes by a few
months for prior convictions, in the United States “the ‘recidivist premium’ often doubles or
triples the sentence”). For additional comparative treatment, see generally volume 76, issue 1
of Law and Contemporary Problems (2013).
2. E.g., Kevin R. Reitz, The Illusion of Proportionality: Desert and Repeat Offenders, in
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES
137, 138–43 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010) [hereinafter Roberts & von
Hirsch] (noting statutes may designate the weight criminal history should carry); Michael
Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism 11 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch.
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-51, 2013) (“Under most
sentencing guidelines systems, third or fourth convictions can result in sentences two-to-four
times longer than are received by first offenders.”).
3. See Nancy J. King & Brynn E. Applebaum, Alleyne on the Ground, Facts Affecting
Eligibility for Probation and Parole (work in progress) (on file with authors) (collecting state
statutes increasing minimum terms of incarceration).
4. The most well-known examples are three strikes laws and dangerous, persistent,
multiple, habitual, or career offender laws. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-1804 (Supp. 2012)
(providing that a repeat offender can receive three times the statutory maximum if the
offender has been convicted of the same or a similar crime twice before); Beth Caldwell,
Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent Mistakes: Juvenile Strikes as Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 581, 645–53 (2012) (collecting two and three strikes laws in
appendix). A prior conviction may aggravate murder to a capital offense, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 921.141(5)(b) (Supp. 2013), or a misdemeanor to a felony, e.g., People v. Barclay, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 277, 280–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); People v. Schreiber, 226 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo.
App. 2009) (collecting authority from other states). In Wisconsin, a prior conviction can
transform a civil infraction into a criminal offense. State v. Verhagen, 827 N.W.2d 891, 896
(Wis. Ct. App. 2013).
5. This Essay does not address Eighth Amendment concerns about repeat-offender
punishment or the use of criminal history in investigation, pretrial release, corrections
administration, or parole.
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Part I traces the history of efforts to identify which defendants have
criminal records, a story important to both claims. Part II explains why
repeat-offender penalties fall short of goals for deterrence,
incapacitation, and retribution, and how relying heavily on criminal
history in setting sentences contributes to the racially lopsided profile of
punishment in America today. Turning to the constitutional regulation
of the sentencing process, Part III critiques the potential justifications
6
for the prior-conviction exception to the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey
and argues that the exception should be abandoned.
II. REPEAT-OFFENDER PUNISHMENT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Punishing the Marked Offender: Colonial Times Through the 1830s
In early America, various statutes mandated stiffer sentences for
7
repeat offenders. But without photography or fingerprints, courts had
no reliable way of determining if a defendant was lying about his past.
Court records included the name and age of each convicted person,
information easily fabricated by those accused of a subsequent charge.
To cope, early American courts often used the same cheap identification
method used in Europe for centuries—marking or branding the body of
8
the person convicted.
Branding first offenders was a common practice after the Founding
that lasted into the early nineteenth century. Many felonies were
punishable by execution, but a defendant convicted for the first time
could seek “benefit of clergy,” essentially a reprieve from execution
granted at the discretion of the judge. If granted, the defendant would
9
be branded instead of put to death. For example, in 1801, future
6. 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that the right to a jury finding of every element of a
criminal offense is violated when facts that increase the sentencing range beyond that
permitted for the offense of conviction are found at sentencing by a judge).
7. SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 13–14 (2d prtg. 2002); JOHN PRATT, GOVERNING THE
DANGEROUS: DANGEROUSNESS, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 9 (1997). For example, in East
Jersey, a third-offense drunkard could be whipped. A first- and second-offense thief had to
make full restitution. SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32–33 (2d ed. 1998). A 1779 Virginia law provided escalating penalties
for sellers of diseased or unwholesome meat, bread, or drink, including pillory for a second
offense, imprisonment and fine for a third offense, and six months hard labor “every time
after.” An Act Prescribing the Punishment of Those Who Sell Unwholesome Meat or Drink,
ch. 53 (1779), 12 Laws Va. 336 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823); see also infra note 12.
8. COLE, supra note 7, at 7; ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 4–6 (discussing the benefit of
clergy and branding in England).
9. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public
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president Andrew Jackson, sitting as a judge in Tennessee, granted
benefit of clergy to a fellow convicted of delivering a “mortal bruise” to
a man’s head with an oak plank. According to the court records, the
10
defendant was immediately “burned in the left hand with the letter M.”
The brand identified him as a convicted felon and prevented him from
claiming the privilege a second time, guaranteeing that any additional
11
felony would be his last. Marking bodies was also used for non-capital
crimes in the eighteenth century. The punishment for some first
12
offenders was to lose one ear; second offenders lost the other.
Good, BYU L. REV. 1099, 1132 (2004) (noting that the “benefit of clergy never functioned as
a special privilege for clergy” in the colonies and was instead “merely a tool” to avoid
applying the death penalty to first-time felonies); e.g., Act of Nov. 27, 1789, ch. 22, § 5, 1789
Va. Acts 14, 15 (providing that for crimes “allowed benefit of clergy the person shall be
burned in the hand for every such offence”); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs,
The “Law Only As an Enemy”: The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the
Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 1009–10 (1992)
(discussing the use of clergy and branding); Nancy J. King, The Origins of Felony Jury
Sentencing in the United States, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937, 948 (2003); John H. Langbein,
Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View From the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 37–41, 37 n.145 (1983); see also Jack Kenny Williams, Crime and Punishment in South
Carolina, 1790–1860, 233, 246–49, 298 (1953) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory
University) (on file with Emory University Library and author) (reporting that, in South
Carolina, twenty-two crimes carried the death penalty as late as 1850 and branding
“ceremonies,” used until 1833 for those “clergied,” were well attended, and courts would
burn the letter T, for thief, and M, for manslaughter, into thumb, cheek, or, in rare cases,
forehead).
10. State v. Childress (Mero Dist. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1801) (order allowing benefit of
clergy), as reprinted in ANDREW JACKSON, LEGAL PAPERS OF ANDREW JACKSON 213–15
(James W. Ely, Jr. & Theodore Brown, Jr. eds., 1988); see also State v. Humphreys, 1 Tenn.
306, 307 (Tenn. Super. L. & Eq. 1808) (noting the court’s pronounced sentence for a horse
thief convicted in 1808: “That he be branded in the presence of the Court, on the inside of the
left hand with the letter H, and on the inside of the right hand with the letter T, between the
hours of twelve and four o’clock this day, and immediately taken to the common whippingpost, and there receive thirty-nine lashes on his bare back”).
11. Some evidence suggests that the marking of offenders was not consistently
employed. By 1774, branding with a cold iron was habitual practice in Virginia, prompting
the author of a leading treatise on the justices of the peace in Virginia to remark that
branding “can scarcely be called even so much as a slight Punishment, but rather a piece of
absurd Pageantry” as the “Iron” is “scarcely heated.” King, supra note 9, at 948 (citing Hugh
F. Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the General Court of Colonial Virginia, 72 VA. MAG.
HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 50, 67 (1964) (quoting RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE AND
AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE EXPLAINED AND DIGESTED, UNDER PROPER TITLES
87–88 (1774))).
12. A 1705 Virginia statute commanded that those sentenced for stealing a pig for the
second time should also be rendered earless. L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., Recidivism and
Virginia’s “Come-Back” Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 597, 598 (1962) (citing An Act Against Stealing
Hogs, ch. 14 (1705), 3 Laws of Va. 276–77 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823)); see also
GEORGE W. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA & RELATED MATTERS 245–47
(1955) (discussing branding and ear cropping provisions in Vermont, not abolished until 1797,
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Although branding was abolished in federal courts in 1790, it
13
persisted in the states. In state courts, branding was replaced by terms
of incarceration only gradually over several decades, as states built their
14
first prisons and enacted new criminal codes. Branding was part of
15
sentencing in Tennessee through the 1820s, persisted in South Carolina
16
17
until 1833, and did not end in North Carolina until 1854.
B. Discovering the Recidivist—Penitentiaries and the Deviant Type—
1820–1880
The construction of the first penitentiaries ushered in a new form of
punishment: lengthy terms of incarceration. Prisons were, in theory,
places of “penitence and reformation,” where criminals could be
removed from corrupting influences though discipline and be “cured” of
18
their criminality.
In practice, prisons in many states were
“extraordinarily brutal” places where more than one in six prisoners
19
died in custody. If a released offender was convicted of another crime,
the spurned opportunity for penitence provided a justification for more

and branding as punishment for manslaughter and larceny in Texas, not ended until 1848).
“Ear cropping” was also an authorized punishment in North Carolina. Id. at 258, 260.
13. DALZELL, supra note 12, at 233–35 (noting that in 1778 “benefit of clergy was an
incident of the criminal law in twelve of the signatory states” where it persisted for more than
ninety years, although eliminated in federal courts in 1790).
14. Jeffrey K. Sawyer, “Benefit of Clergy” in Maryland and Virginia, 34 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 49, 66–67 (1990) (noting that the benefit of clergy was abolished in Virginia in 1796 and
Maryland in 1807 by laws providing that every person convicted of felonies before deemed
clergyable shall undergo imprisonment, and noting that Virginia’s new law coincided with
construction of a new prison in Richmond). For a listing of the dates that each state built its
first penitentiary and enacted a new criminal code, see King, supra note 9, at 990–93.
15. E.g., Crenshaw v. State, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 122, 123 (1827) (noting that sentence
for horse thief included being “branded in the brawn of the left thumb H. T.”).
16. Williams, supra note 9, at 233; see also JACKSON, supra note 10, at 213 (branding
ended in Tennessee in 1829). For slaves, however, the practice continued. In Virginia, for
example, convicted slaves who escaped hanging or being sold to slave traders as punishment,
see generally Philip J. Schwarz, The Transportation of Slaves from Virginia, 1801–1865, 7
SLAVERY & ABOLITION 215 (1986), were considered too valuable to incarcerate in Virginia’s
new penitentiary. Instead, they were “burned in the palm of the left hand with a hot poker”
in court, then “taken immediately to the whipping post” and lashed. Robert M. Saunders,
Crime and Punishment in Early National America: Richmond, Virginia, 1784–1820, 86 VA.
MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY, Jan. 1978, at 33, 42.
17. DALZELL, supra note 12, at 259–60.
18. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77–
82 (1993).
19. Id. at 90 (noting that, in 1870, 41% of Alabama prisoners died and that, during the
two prior years, the figure had been 17% and 18%, respectively). The official death rates
were often lowered by pardoning inmates who were near death. Id.

KING FINAL (6-30-14) (W-APP 11) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

SENTENCING AND PRIOR CONVICTIONS

7/2/2014 5:15 PM

529

20

severe punishment. Prisons allowed legislatures to proportion criminal
penalties, increasing the term of incarceration with each additional
unheeded lesson.
When it opened its penitentiary in 1817,
Massachusetts, for example, amended its code to mandate an extra
seven years for every offender with one prior conviction and life in
21
prison for those with two prior convictions —one of the earlier “three22
strikes-and-you’re-out statutes” in the United States.
Penitentiaries also offered hope of more effective identification of
prior offenders. A single state list replaced decentralized county
conviction records and included descriptions of marks, scars, or tattoos
23
on each prisoner’s body. But these rudimentary records of the bodies
entering and leaving prisons were still organized only by name. It was
not possible to look up a person by a missing toe or unusual scar.
Moreover, as Alexis de Tocqueville reported after observing these early
penitentiaries, identification was possible only if an offender was
24
returned to prison in the same state. Judges were aware that many
“first offenders” were actually repeat offenders, whose true identities
might, or might not, be revealed later when someone recognized them in
prison. As de Tocqueville concluded, noting how easily a person could
pass from state to state, “the courts condemn, almost always, without
25
knowing the true name of the criminal, and still less his previous life.”

20. Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738, 747–48 (1852) (“[T]he mischief was a
want of reformation . . . the legislature intended that the culprit should first hear the monitory
voice of the law before the heavier doom should be announced . . . .”).
21. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 28, 31–32 (1831) (describing statute of
1818); PRATT, supra note 7, at 9. Virginia had a similar scheme. L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L.,
supra note 12, at 598–99 (describing revised code of 1819 with graded enhancements).
22. Other states during this period passed laws punishing second-time thieves more
severely. See, e.g., Stevens v. People, 1 Hill 261, 262–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). In England, this
sort of law was not used until the usual means of ridding the country of the unwanted
convicted criminals—deportation to the British colonies, including Australia—was phased out
in 1869. See COLE, supra note 7, at 18.
23. COLE, supra note 7, at 10–11; ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 6.
24. COLE, supra note 7, at 17 (“‘If . . . a delivered convict commits a new crime under a
fictitious name, he can very easily conceal his relapse, providing he is not brought back to the
prison where he underwent his first punishment. . . . [T]here is no central power to which the
police officers might refer to obtain information respecting the previous life of an indicted
person . . . .’” (quoting G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 72 (Francis Leiber
trans., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1964) (1833))).
25. See Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B. U. L. REV. 1561, 1564 (2012) (quoting
BEAUMONT & DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 24, at 101–02); COLE, supra note 7, at 17.
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Legislatures recognized this too, and a few states in the early 1800s
changed their laws to address it. At the end of the eighteenth century,
every state followed the established common law rule: any prior
conviction that would boost the sentence had to be alleged in the
26
indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. But when
the Massachusetts legislature learned that supposed first offenders were
being recognized as former inmates when they arrived at the new
penitentiary, it passed a statute that provided an alternative to the
common law rule. Whenever the warden recognized a person as a prior
offender, he had to notify the state’s attorney, who in turn had to charge
the prisoner as a repeat offender in a supplemental charging document
27
called an information.
The prisoner would then be brought from
prison back to court. If his past conviction was admitted or proven to a
28
new jury beyond a reasonable doubt, he would be sentenced to the
punishment mandated for second offenders (seven years) or third
29
offenders (life), as the case may be. Through the nineteenth century,
most states continued to require the prosecutor to allege in the
indictment any former convictions that would increase an offender’s
30
sentence and prove those convictions along with the charge. But a
handful of states adopted processes similar to that in Massachusetts, so
that when an alias was exposed at the penitentiary, the sentence of the
31
newly identified defendant could be increased.
As cities grew during the Industrial Revolution, crime was
32
increasingly blamed on a small class of repeat or “habitual” offenders,
33
considered biologically inferior to normal, law-abiding citizens.
Phrenologists and craniologists attempted to identify the physical
manifestations of criminality, scientists searched for its biological
26. See infra notes 140, 144–47.
27. See Plumbly v. Commonwealth, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 413, 415 (1841); In re Ross, 19
Mass. (2 Pick.) 165, 183 (1824).
28. E.g., Commonwealth v. Briggs, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 429, 438 (1827) (“No presumptions
are to be made against the prisoner. The government must prove every essential
allegation.”).
29. Plumbly, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) at 416–17; In re Ross, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) at 167; see also
Commonwealth v. Phillips, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 28, 34 (1831) (“This proceeding by information
to award additional punishment where sentence has already been pronounced, is founded
solely on statute, is not known at the common law, is in a high degree penal, and therefore is
not to be extended by construction beyond the cases clearly contemplated by the statute.”).
30. See infra notes 140, 143–44.
31. See infra note 140.
32. COLE, supra note 7, at 10–15 (noting that this belief was encouraged by crime
statistics, which began to appear in the 1820s).
33. Id. at 13.
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34

35

causes, and legislatures expanded punishment for repeat offenders.
Yet, as the U.S. Civil War ended, courts still had no practical, reliable
36
way to determine who had been convicted before.
Criminal
identification continued to depend upon personal recognition by
37
sheriffs, prosecutors, judges, and wardens.
C. Technology to the Rescue—Photos, Bertillonage, and Fingerprints—
1880–1930

By 1930, identification of past offenders had completely changed.
Photography began the transformation. The very first “rogues gallery”
was displayed at the New York Police Department, with 450
ambrotypes in that collection by 1858. Photography became more
accessible in the 1870s and 1880s, and by the late nineteenth century,
police departments all over the world had a gallery, or registry, of
photographs of the faces of past offenders associated with various
38
names. But there remained no efficient way to search hundreds of
photographs.
This problem was solved by a revolutionary system of identification
39
invented in France by Alfonse Bertillon. Using an index of eleven
bodily measurements rather than names, the Bertillon system identified
a prisoner in minutes. It won over the wardens in New York and
40
Illinois, who mandated measurements for all inmates by the 1890s.
Prisons and police departments in other states followed suit.
Fingerprinting was not far behind. In the 1880s, immigration
authorities in California used it to identify Chinese immigrants who had
been granted return certificates, but not until 1904 was it introduced to
law enforcement to supplement or replace the Bertillon system.
34. Id. at 15.
35. E.g., State v. Wilbor, 1 R.I. 199, 199–200 (1846) (discussing an 1844 statute). States
that had formerly punished as recidivists those who had been to their own state’s penitentiary
expanded their laws to reach those who had been convicted of felonies in other states. E.g.,
Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738, 740–41 (1852).
36. For a while, officials in Britain attempted to maintain a national “Distinctive Marks
Register,” an index of scars and other marks, but it would take a clerk between ten and ninety
hours to identify a person using the cumbersome process, which required first looking up the
mark by body part, then by type of mark, then by location on the body part, and so on.
However, by 1877, the register only applied to individuals identified as habitual criminals
through other means because it became too expensive to maintain. COLE, supra note 7, at 27.
37. Id. at 10–11.
38. Id. at 22.
39. Id. at 32.
40. Id. at 53, 55.
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Fingerprinting was first used in criminal cases in New York City for
women, as Bertillon operators reportedly found it awkward to measure
the body parts of prostitutes. Once fingerprinting was extended to men
41
in 1913, within four years the Magistrates’ Court of New York City
42
reportedly identified 31,000 individuals.
Gradually, fingerprinting
replaced Bertillonage so that by the end of the 1930s fingerprinting was
43
the dominant method for identification.
D. Parole and Probation for Some, Incapacitation for the Dangerous—
1890–1970
The new means of identifying repeat criminals reinforced the belief
44
that a small group of offenders committed most crime. “Instinctive
criminals,” it was argued in 1891, could be identified by their “ill-shaped
heads”; “asymmetrical faces”; “deformed, . . . ill-developed bodies”;
“abnormal conditions of the genital organs”; “large, heavy jaws”;
45
“outstanding ears”; and “a restless, animal-like, or brutal expression.”
“Criminal anthropologists” asserted that recidivists were “smaller in
stature with longer and broader heads,” with “furtive restless eyes,” and
that a primary cause of recidivism is “physical and mental degeneracy of
46
the hereditary and acquired types.” Many thought they should be
47
segregated from society like the criminally insane. Eventually, sixteen
48
states passed laws authorizing the sterilization of habitual criminals, a
41. Id. at 155–58.
42. People v. Sallow, 165 N.Y.S. 915, 918 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1917) (citing FINGER PRINT
BUREAU, REPORT OF ALFRED A. HART, in ANNUAL REPORT, CITY MAGISTRATES’
COURTS, CITY OF NEW YORK 102, 103 (1915)).
43. COLE, supra note 7, at 32, 229–32 (noting that Bertillonage was still in use in the
1930s); see also Kelley v. State, 185 N.E. 453, 456 (Ind. 1933) (noting testimony by Bertillon
expert).
44. COLE, supra note 7, at 29.
45. S.A.K. STRAHAN, INSTINCTIVE CRIMINALITY: ITS TRUE CHARACTER AND
RATIONAL TREATMENT 189 (John Bale & Sons 1891).
46. J.F. SUTHERLAND, RECIDIVISM: HABITUAL CRIMINALITY, AND HABITUAL PETTY
DELINQUENCY 59 (1908); see also COLE, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing attempts to create a
composite face of known criminals, an effort that Cole says “became a crude pretext for
prejudices, such as the association of criminality with . . . Eastern and Southern Europeans,
Jews, Gypsies and others who simply looked lower class”); WALKER, supra note 7, at 113
(noting that Americans saw the immigrants as bringing more crime in the early 1900s).
47. L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12, at 600 & nn.25–26.
48. PRATT, supra note 7, at 49–50 (“For the proponents of eugenics, mere exclusion
from the rest of society for life as a punishment for the habituals was not enough: they should
also be denied any opportunity for reproducing their kind to prevent a continuation of their
diseased lineage . . . [S]terilisation was introduced to the penal programme in sixteen State
jurisdictions in the United States.”).
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practice not struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court until 1942.
Leading scholars such as Norval Morris considered the eugenics effect
of protracted detention of habitual criminals “possibly scientifically
50
fruitful.”
The new identification techniques also reassured legislatures that
penalties for recidivists would no longer be applied arbitrarily, that is,
51
only to those whose attempts to hide their pasts happened to fail.
Recidivist statutes flourished in the 1890s and early decades of the
52
53
twentieth century. For example, anyone convicted in New York or
54
Missouri of a felony with a life sentence as the possible maximum got
life as the mandatory sentence if he had been previously convicted of a
felony or petit theft. Some laws targeted those who committed
55
56
particular offenses, such as second-time gamblers, thieves, drug
57
58
possessors, or liquor sellers. By 1930, Congress had passed a law

49. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942). See generally PAUL A. LOMBARDO,
THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V.
BELL (2008); VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND
THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS (2008).
50. NORVAL MORRIS, THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 22, 24 n.2 (1951) (citing HERMANN
MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 226–37 (Karl Mannheim
ed., 1st ed. 1946)).
51. COLE, supra note 7, at 5.
52. PRATT, supra note 7, at 35 (noting that “recidivist statutes reached the zenith of their
popularity . . . in the late 1920s” and 1930s just as fingerprinting was becoming routine
(quoting George K. Brown, Note, The Treatment of the Recidivist in the United States, 23
CAN. B. REV. 640, 642 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Miller, 68
N.W. 990, 990 (Mich. 1896) (describing a statute limiting “good time” for second offenders);
Blackburn v. State, 36 N.E. 18, 20 (Ohio 1893) (describing Section 2 of an act that passed the
Ohio legislature on May 4, 1885, which mandated life sentences for third-time offenders).
53. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 55–56 (1914); PRATT, supra note 7, at 35
(describing a 1907 law in New York).
54. See Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676 (1895); State v. Austin, 21 S.W. 31, 32 (Mo.
1893).
55. E.g., Wolf v. State, 206 S.W. 39 (Ark. 1918) (discussing how Act 55, of the Acts of
1907, punished the second offense for betting on horses more severely).
56. E.g., State v. Jones, 128 F. 626, 627 (S.D. Iowa 1904) (describing an 1898 act); In re
Boggs, 45 F. 475, 475 (C.C.D. Ky. 1891) (providing that third-time larceny carried life
sentence); Kelley v. People, 4 N.E. 644, 644–45 (Ill. 1886) (describing an 1883 act); Evans v.
State, 50 N.E. 820, 820 (Ind. 1898) (describing an 1894 act); State v. Loehr, 5 S.W. 696, 696
(Mo. 1887).
57. People v. Mock Don Yuen, 227 P. 948, 949 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (narcotics).
58. Banas v. People, 211 P. 367, 367 (Colo. 1922); State v. Watson, 142 P. 956, 956 (Kan.
1914); State v. Adams, 132 P. 171, 172 (Kan. 1913); see also Cross v. State, 78 Ala. 430, 432
(1885) (describing a statute that punished a second conviction for the offense of living in
adultery with the same person with a more-severe penalty).
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punishing Prohibition violators more severely for subsequent offenses,
and twenty-three states had passed new habitual offender laws, many
providing for a mandatory life sentence for the third or fourth felony
60
conviction.
Lawmakers also developed a particular interest in the dangerousness
of sexual offenders, and twenty-six states introduced laws authorizing
61
lifetime imprisonment of those adjudged to be “sexual psychopaths.”
By 1949, thirty-two states had established criminal identification
bureaus, and the number of states with habitual felony offender statutes
had grown to forty-three—five of these states mandated life for the third
offense, ten for the fourth offense, and another ten permitted the judge
62
discretion to sentence a third or fourth striker to life in prison.
The new identification techniques facilitated greater leniency as well
as severity. By convincing legislators that corrections officials and
judges could sort first offenders more likely to be rehabilitated from
hardened criminals, improvements in criminal identification enabled
new statutes authorizing release on conditions and the beginning of
63
probation and parole.

59. United States v. Lindquist, 285 F. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1921) (discussing the National
Prohibition Act, which prescribed a greater punishment for “a second or subsequent offense”
and provided that the prosecuting officer shall “plead the prior conviction”). This was not the
first federal repeat-offender provision. Congress imposed a mandatory minimum of twentyfive years in prison for second-time mail thieves in 1909. Comp. Stat. 1449, § 197 (John A.
Mallory) (Supp. 1909).
60. COLE, supra note 7, at 217; L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12, at 599 n.17; see also
PRATT, supra note 7, at 35 (quoting Brown, supra note 52, at 640, 640–83).
61. PRATT, supra note 7, at 70, 93–95 (citing Alan H. Swanson, Sexual Psychopath
Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 215, 215–27
(1960)) (stating that “homosexuality, psychopathy and paedophilia were likely to be conflated
to produce the image of the middle-aged sex fiend, with children as his target”). In 1937, J.
Edgar Hoover penned an article titled War on the Sex Criminal, which begins with this:
“[T]he sex fiend, most loathsome of all the vast army of crime, has become a threat to the
safety of American childhood and womanhood.” See COLE, supra note 7 (citation omitted).
62. See Paul W. Tappan, Habitual Offender Laws in the United States, 13 FED.
PROBATION 28, 28 (1949) (“Analysis has revealed that fairly well-standardized multiple
offender statutes for habitual felons exist in 43 of the 48 states . . . .”).
63. COLE, supra note 7, at 218 (discussing that, with increased confidence, they could
provide probation or parole for novices in crime who might still be rehabilitated, and that
parole began to be used for some recidivists after World War I); WALKER, supra note 7, at
118–23.
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E. A Punitive Turn—Three Strikes and Other Mandatory Sentencing
Laws—1970 on
After several decades of attempts to diagnose and treat what was
64
considered to be the disease of recidivism, legislators decided to rein in
the discretion of judges and parole authorities and rewrote sentencing
laws in every state. One of the most frequent changes was an increase in
65
penalties for repeat offenders.
As a dozen states and the federal
government adopted judicial sentencing guidelines, commissions keyed
66
In states that retained parole, new
sentences to criminal history.
recidivism laws included provisions denying or delaying parole eligibility
67
for repeat offenders.
By 1996, twenty-four states and the federal
68
government had passed new, stricter three strikes laws. In some states,
such as California and Washington, these laws were enacted by ballot
69
initiative.
California’s law provided that anyone with a first-strike
offense on his record must receive a doubled prison sentence for a

64. E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 160; ALASTAIR W. MACLEOD, RECIDIVISM: A
DEFICIENCY DISEASE (1965).
65. COLE, supra note 7, at 217–18; Christopher T. Link & Neal Shover, The Origins of
Criminal Sentencing Reforms, 3 JUST. Q. 329, 334 (1986).
66. Tonry, supra note 2, at 3–4 (discussing parole guidelines using “salient factors” that
predict recidivism adopted by U.S. Parole Commission and several other states).
67. For example, Florida in 1988 denied parole eligibility for the first fifteen years of
imprisonment to habitual violent felony offenders. See 1988 Fla. Laws 708 (amending Fla.
Stat. § 775.084(4)(b)1 (1988)).
68. JOHN CLARK, JAMES AUSTIN & D. ALAN HENRY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
“THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT”: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 1 (1997) (twentyfour states enacted three strikes laws between 1993 and 1995); Ely Aharonson, Determinate
Sentencing and American Exceptionalism: The Underpinnings and Effects of Cross-National
Differences in the Regulation of Sentencing Discretion, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 166
(2013) (noting Congress created a range of fiscal incentives for states to enact three strikes
laws); COLE, supra note 7, at 223; Michael Tonry, Penal Developments in America, in PENAL
REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 20 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001); see also Michael Tonry,
Sentencing in America, 1975–2025, at 24 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-44, 2013) (noting that the laws mandating at least
twenty-five years have a “sleeper effect”—those first sentenced under them are still serving
their twenty-five-year terms). Alaska added its three strikes law a decade later in 2006. See
Tonry, Sentencing in America 1975–2025, supra, at 11 n.5 (citing Elsa Y. Chen, Impacts of
“Three Strikes and You’re Out” on Crime Trends in California and Throughout the United
States, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 345, 349 (2008)).
69. VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 118 (2009); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE
STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 11 (2001); Aharonson, supra note 68, at 176–77;
Robert Heglin, A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means: “Three Strikes and You’re Out,” 20
J. LEGIS. 213, 222 (1994).
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subsequent conviction and anyone with two priors must be sentenced to
70
a term of twenty-five years to life for a third felony offense.
The effects of these laws have varied by state. In most, repeat71
offender sentences are uncommon. But in Washington State as of last
year, nearly 70% of the 637 prisoners serving life-without-parole
72
In
sentences were sentenced under the state’s three strikes law.
California, where a second strike carries a doubled sentence and the
third strike carries twenty-five years to life, the effect was huge:
maximum sentences statewide grew 6% longer, and the odds of a prison
73
sentence rose by nearly 23%. As of 2009, one of every four state
74
prisoners in California was serving a second- or third-strike sentence,
75
and of these, 55% were convicted of a nonviolent offense. Florida and

70. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., SECOND AND THIRD STRIKER FELONS IN THE
ADULT INSTITUTION POPULATION (2012).
71. Chen, supra note 68, 345, 350–51 (compiling the results of telephone and e-mail
interviews with state criminal justice authorities conducted in the fall of 2006 to determine the
frequency of use of two and three strikes provisions and noting every state other than
California reported fewer than 400 second- and third-strike convictions since passage; with
Washington, Nevada, South Carolina, and Virginia reporting more than 300; Pennsylvania,
Arkansas, Wisconsin, New Jersey, Vermont, Maryland, Florida, Alaska, and Connecticut
reporting rare use (just a few prisoners total or up to a dozen at most per year); and Montana
and Utah reporting their laws have never been used); Yan Zhang, Christopher D. Maxwell &
Michael S. Vaughn, The Impact of State Sentencing Policies on the U.S. Prison Population, 37
J. CRIM. JUST. 190, 197 (2009) (noting studies of the explosion in prison population between
early 1970s and 2000 found three-strikes laws “had little national impact because few
offenders outside of California, Florida, and Georgia were ever sentenced under [these]
provision[s]” (citing Walter J. Dickey & Pam Hollenhorst, Three-Strikes Laws: Five Years
Later, CORR. MGMT. Q., Summer 1999, at 1–8; VINCENT SCHIRALDI ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY
INST., THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF 3-STRIKE
LAWS 10 YEARS AFTER THEIR ENACTMENT 4–5 (2004))).
72. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE
SENTENCES IN AMERICA 16 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
inc_Life%20Goes%20On%202013.pdf.
73. John R. Sutton, Symbol and Substance: Effects of California’s Three Strikes Law on
Felony Sentencing, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 37, 66 (2013).
74. Caldwell, supra note 4, at 589 n.44 (citing CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
INMATES SENTENCED UNDER THE THREE STRIKES LAW AND A SMALL NUMBER OF
INMATES RECEIVING SPECIALTY HEALTH CARE REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT COSTS 1 (2010));
see also CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., SECOND AND THIRD STRIKE FELONS IN THE
ADULT INSTITUTION POPULATION tbls.1, 6 (showing 42,417 prisoners in California were
serving second- and third-strike sentences, 1,900 of the inmates were over sixty years old,
6,000 of the offenses were drug crimes, and 11,000 of the offenses were property crimes).
75. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 72, at 16. Also, from 1999 to 2012, the
number of LWOP sentences doubled, and the percentage of LWOP prisoners sentenced
under California’s three strikes law grew from 7% to 68%. Id.
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Georgia also saw large numbers of people incarcerated under their three
76
strike laws.
Today this background sets the stage for two of the challenges that
repeat-offender penalties pose for courts and legislatures. First is the
escalating attack on the recidivist premiums as miscalibrated and
unjustified given the purposes of punishment. The other is the
questionable constitutionality of the process many jurisdictions use to
impose longer sentences for offenders with prior convictions.
III. JUSTIFYING AND CALIBRATING PENALTIES FOR REPEAT
OFFENDERS: THE MISMATCH BETWEEN THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
PRACTICE
Repeat-offender penalties—as applied—too often fail to accomplish
their intended purposes, and these penalties may carry unanticipated
costs. Exactly which aims of criminal punishment these penalties should
promote is a question that continues to generate debate, with advocates
falling into one of two camps. On one side are consequentialists who
believe additional punishment is warranted if it deters future crime or
incapacitates the dangerous. On the other side are retributivists who
believe such punishment is legitimate only if it reflects increased
77
culpability. But even if a legislature could decide which theory it cares
78
about most, repeat-offender penalties are poorly designed to achieve
either.
A. Deterrence: Weak Effects
Proponents of repeat-offender provisions have argued that
escalating penalties deter convicted offenders from committing
79
additional crimes.
Yet research testing this hypothesis shows that
76. Caldwell, supra note 4, at 629 n.288 (citing SCHIRALDI ET AL., supra note 71, at 4).
77. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 29. Rehabilitation is also a potential basis for more
lenient sentences for first offenders but is difficult to reconcile with “harsher or more
intrusive sentences each time the offender is reconvicted” and, in any event, appears much
less important to policymakers than deterrence and incapacitation in discussions of this topic.
Id. at 36.
78. Id. at ch. 8 (noting that public opinion and legislative statements seem to support
both theories—desert and dangerousness; both believe in a greater probability of future
offending and greater culpability).
79. E.g., Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 54–55 (1937) (explaining that
“[p]ersistence in crime and failure of earlier discipline effectively to deter or reform justify
more drastic treatment” is analogous to the interest in punishing those who escape with
sanctions keyed to the sentence they were serving when they escaped); Estella Baker &
Andrew Ashworth, The Role of Previous Convictions in England and Wales, in Roberts &
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repeat-offender provisions have had only weak success, if any, in
80
deterring crime.
Such laws appear to be associated with a small
decrease in robbery, burglary, car theft, and larceny consistent across
multiple states but have had no detectable impact at all on crime in
some states, such as California, where they have been used most
81
aggressively. As one scholar put it in a recent review, the results of
attempts to test the individual deterrent effects of incarceration are
“rather bleak; the majority of studies have found that incarceration has
either no effect or undesirable effects on subsequent offending,”

von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 185 (noting that the public believes punishment has greater
deterrent value than is supported by research); PRATT, supra note 7, at 10 (describing a late
nineteenth century justification, “[F]or those that repeated their crimes, additional quantities
of it would be necessary to act as a deterrent where lesser amounts had hitherto proved to be
ineffective”).
80. Lila Kazemian, Assessing the Impact of a Recidivist Sentencing Premium on Crime
and Recidivism Rates, in Roberts & von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 227, 242–44 (collecting
studies and noting that “[v]arious studies have demonstrated the negligible (or even
detrimental) effects of three-strikes laws on crime rates, despite substantial increase in costs”
(citations omitted)); Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 446 (1997) (finding that California’s three strikes law did not
appear to affect the juvenile crime rate); Tonry, supra note 68, at 39 (collecting authority and
noting that “[m]ost credible empirical assessments of California’s three-strikes law’s effects
on crime rates and patterns have concluded that none can be shown,” except a few—using the
methodology Tonry critiques—that found a small effect).
Incarceration generally has been shown to have little effect on crime rates although the
studies are conflicting. Compare ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 33 (noting studies that find little
relationship between punishment severity and aggregate crime rates), and Tonry, supra note
68, at 36–39 (arguing that government reviews and scholarship have rebutted claims of
general deterrence, including Pratt et al.’s 2006 finding of no significant effects and Durlauf
and Nagin’s 2011 finding that at best there is only a modest deterrent effect from increases in
severity of punishment and that effects of imprisonment “might on average be criminogenic
rather than crime-preventative” (citing Travis C. Pratt et al., The Empirical Status of
Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL
THEORY 367, 379 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., 2006); Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin,
Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 31
(2011))), and MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. e, at 34 (Tentative Draft No.
1 2007) (“The feasibility of general deterrence through marginal increases in the severity of
criminal punishments is in doubt, at least for many species of criminal behavior.”), with
Kazemian, supra, at 238–40 (collecting studies finding some short-term decreases in aggregate
crime rates following increased incarceration rates).
81. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 69, at 93–105 (finding only weak evidence of marginal
deterrence on third strikers and no hint of any decline on second strikers); Chen, supra note
68, at 362–63 (finding laws associated with “accelerated rates of decline for robbery, burglary,
larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft” in conjunction with data on the relatively few inmates
incarcerated under three strikes policies in most states, suggesting that any crime reduction
associated with the presence of three strikes laws outside California should probably be
attributed to deterrence effects rather than incarceration effects, and concluding that
narrowly constructed and seldom-used laws may be as effective as broader laws).
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although she did note that the limitations of existing research are too
82
substantial to draw firm conclusions.
One drawback of this research, for example, is the difficulty of
accounting for variables that have been shown to influence recidivism
rates, such as the type and quality of supervision after release and other
83
correctional policies and practices that continue to change and evolve.
As another researcher concluded: “The causes and correlates of rises
and declines in crime rates are numerous, diverse, and
elusive . . . . [P]olicy makers must keep in mind that even major changes
84
in sentencing policy may result in only modest impacts on crime rates.”
Additional explanations offered by researchers for the failure of repeatoffender sentences to reduce crime include: the general lack of
85
knowledge about sentencing law; the criminogenic effects of prison
86
terms; population constraints that require the release of inmates who
are more likely to recidivate in order to make room for three strikers
87
who are nonviolent or already in the process of “aging out” of crime;
and incarceration’s tendency to increase other risk factors for crime such
88
as social disorder and the dissolution of families.
B. Incapacitating the Dangerous: Predicting Risk from Criminal History
A second more commonly voiced rationale for recidivist penalties is
the incapacitation of those most likely to commit future crime. It is this
theory that has most consistently motivated increased punishment for
repeat criminals in earlier eras, as lawmakers have attempted to lock up

82. Kazemian, supra note 80, at 240, 242.
83. E.g., Michael Ostermann, Recidivism and the Propensity to Forgo Parole Release, 29
JUST. Q. 596, 596–97 (2012); James A. Wilson, Bad Behavior or Bad Policy? An Examination
of Tennessee Release Cohorts, 1993–2001, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 485, 485–86 (2005).
84. Chen, supra note 68, at 363.
85. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 32 (noting “low rates of awareness of sentencing
provisions, even for common or well-publicized offenses such as dr[unk] driving”).
86. Kazemian, supra note 80, at 239.
87. Chen, supra note 68, at 360; Kazemian, supra note 80, at 243.
88. Kazemian, supra note 80, at 239; see also RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING:
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 189 (2013) (citing Kazemian,
supra note 80; Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Processes of Redemption Should be
Built into the Use of Criminal-History Records for Background Checking, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: POLICY PROPOSALS FROM THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY CONFERENCE 37 (Natasha A. Frost et al. eds., 2010)
(noting that existing criminal history formulas are likely “overpredicting offender risk by
failing to account for such factors as nonrecency, aging effects, other changes in the offender’s
circumstances, substantial periods of desistance, and trends toward desistance”).
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those perceived to be dangerous recidivists. Parole authorities have for
many decades used risk assessment and predictions of dangerousness to
decide when to release an offender on parole and to select conditions of
release. Only recently have these so-called evidence-based methods
been embraced by judges and legislators as tools for initial sentencing.
Supporters of “smart,” or evidence-based sentencing, hope that
calibrating sentences based upon risk will allow states to trim prison
90
populations while getting the most bang for their criminal justice buck.
In some jurisdictions, risk scores are formally incorporated into
91
sentencing statutes or guidelines. In Virginia, risk scores determine
92
who is eligible for alternative punishment. In Missouri, judges rely on
an automated recommendation reporting the offender’s risk score and
predicted recidivism after two years for offenders in his specific risk
93
category.
Kentucky and Indiana include risk assessments in

89. See supra notes 31–34, 43–49 and accompanying text; see also MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 6B.09 discussion at 24–25 (Discussion Draft No. 3, 2010) (“Recidivism
risk . . . is the primary utilitarian justification for the heavy emphasis usually placed on
criminal history as a sentencing factor.”); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 15.
90. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., LESSONS FROM THE STATES:
REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND CURBING CORRECTIONS COSTS THROUGH JUSTICE
REINVESTMENT 4 (2013) (noting that “many states fail to focus their incarceration . . . on the
people most likely to commit future crimes” and advocate for the use of risk assessment
instruments); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 21 (noting that “risk is privileged above other
considerations at sentencing”); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled”
Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270, 271 (2013) (noting a similar trend).
91. Guidelines incorporating higher penalties for prior offenders are sometimes at least
initially based on risk assessment instruments. See, e.g., Daniel A. Krauss, Evaluating Science
Outside the Trial Box: Applying Daubert to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Criminal
History Score, 29 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 289 (2006); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL
GUIDELINES—A COMPONENT OF THE FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT ON THE U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION’S LEGISLATIVE MANDATE 1 (2004) [hereinafter MEASURING RECIDIVISM];
Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1201 (2005).
92. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note d at 52 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2011); BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., THE NAT’L CTR FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA.
CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREESTAGE EVALUATION 48 (2002); Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics to Sentence Individual
Criminals: An Ethical and Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk Assessment Program, 97 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 699 (2007).
93. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note i at 61 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2011); Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety
Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1404 (2008); Michael A. Wolff,
Missouri Provides Cost of Sentences and Recidivism Data: What Does Cost Have to Do with
Justice?, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 161, 162 (2012).
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94

presentence reports.
Risk assessment, one scholar noted, “is
95
transforming the way that sentencing judges do business.”
As an
indication of how controversial this is, the leading legal periodical on
sentencing, the Federal Sentencing Reporter, recently devoted an entire
96
issue to it. Risk assessment at sentencing also triggered a major debate
in the American Law Institute, resulting in a provision that endorses its
97
limited use.
Many understandably object to the use of risk prediction in
sentencing as unfair: it punishes a defendant more severely just because
he has the same characteristics as other people who reoffended after
release, and it deprives him of liberty for what he might do rather than
98
what he actually did. Although an offender’s criminal history plays a
prominent role in risk assessment, some critics of risk assessment are
most concerned about its reliance upon factors other than prior criminal

94. See Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Ind. 2010); Sonja B. Starr, EvidenceBased Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014); see also Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 272 (noting use of the risk
assessment in Pennsylvania).
95. J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and EvidenceBased Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1394 (2011); see also Discussion of Model Penal
Code: Sentencing, 88 A.L.I. PROC. 123, 133 (2011) (“[T]he use of risk to lengthen sentences is
the dominant practice in the United States today.” (statement of Professor Kevin Reitz)).
96. Risk Assessment: Methodologies and Application, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 161 (2004);
see also Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 271 (“There is a lack of consensus about the
suitability, use, and actual role played by actuarial instruments [generally] in sentencing.”).
97. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09, at 52–53 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2011); id. app. B at 131; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 discussion at 26
(Discussion Draft 2010) (“Should research-based risk and needs assessment be incorporated
into sentencing guidelines and made an explicit part of the judicial sentencing process? Is the
MPCS draft correct to encourage the use of actuarial risk assessment at sentencing as a
prison-diversion tool, while hesitating to endorse a similar use of risk assessment as a basis for
enhanced penalties?”); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING app. A at 341 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2007) (Black-Letter Provisions Amended to Establish a System of Advisory Sentencing
Guidelines); id. § 6B.07 cmt. b at 233–34 (“There is controversy within the research
community about the degree of predictive power of criminal history standing in isolation, and
reason to believe that predictive accuracy varies with circumstances. There are also concerns
that sentencing schemes that place heavy weight on prior offending exacerbate punishment
disparities affecting racial and ethnic minority groups. Given that current knowledge on
these important subjects is far from adequate, § 6B.07 leaves open the possibility that, for
some, many, or all offenses, commissions of the future might decide the consideration of
criminal history should be eliminated or given muted effect.”).
98. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 32; see also, e.g., Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 278
(noting that “[i]nstead of understanding that an individual with a high risk score shares
characteristics with an aggregate group of high-risk offenders, practitioners are likely to
perceive the individual as a high risk offender,” that the person “poses a greater danger to
society and sentencing him/her accordingly”); Tonry, supra note 2, at 6 n.7.
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99

history, such as gender or age, over which the offender has no
100
control.
Reliance upon such factors, they argue, violates the Equal
101
Protection Clause. But a growing chorus is warning that even the use
of criminal history to predict recidivism risk is unjustified, or
counterproductive. Two of the main criticisms critique the reliability of
predictions of recidivism based on past offending and the corrosive
racial effects of escalating punishment for those with prior convictions.
1. Concerns About the Reliability of Risk Predictions Based upon
Criminal History
First, even though the best risk-prediction assessments are better
than expert judgment and can correctly predict the risk class of an
102
offender as often as seven out of ten times, sentencing based on
criminal history as practiced is not risk assessment at its best.
Continuing research, testing whether criminal history predicts future
criminality, does support a relationship between past and future

99. E.g., Tonry, supra note 2 (noting explicit use of gender under Virginia guidelines).
Research shows that women are less likely to recidivate. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.09
reporter’s note i at 61 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (collecting studies); MEASURING
RECIDIVISM, supra note 91, at 11 (reporting the results of a study that found that women
recidivate at a lower rate than men, with a rate of 24.3% for men and 13.7% for women);
PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 7 (2002).
100. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW,
SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 113–
14 (2007) (collecting criticism of the use of factors over which an individual has little or no
control). See generally Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90 (criticizing the use and reliance on noncriminal history factors in sentencing).
101. See Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 196, 209 (noting the Council of Europe’s
proposal to prohibit risk assessments other than in past crimes); Starr, supra note 94.
102. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note e at 60 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011) (“The better risk scales can yield correct classifications, measured against
actual recidivism data, in up to 70 percent of all cases . . . .”) (collecting authority); Paul
Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What
Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 588 (1996); Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Guideline-Based
Justice: Prediction and Racial Minorities, 9 CRIME & JUST. 151, 174 (1987) (noting that the
predictive power of risk assessment instruments is at best sixty to seventy percent accurate);
Slobogin, supra note 101, at 209.
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103

offending. But the research also raises concerns about the reliability
104
of predicting recidivism based on criminal history.
Much of the research supporting the reliability of risk prediction
instruments has tested instruments that were developed to predict
recidivism by parolees and to select conditions of release. These
instruments include variables such as age, gender, and type of offense, as
well as “dynamic” factors that change after sentencing, such as
treatment for substance abuse or mental health issues, physical health,
105
job training, education, marital status, and social support. Predicting
risk based on prior criminal history alone omits all of these factors,
106
increasing the number of cases for which the prediction is wrong.
There may be good reasons for omitting all factors other than criminal
history from risk assessments at sentencing. However, when the only

103. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note a at 58–59 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that predictions of future felony
offending are more reliable when multiple previous convictions are taken into account than
when they are not); Petersilia & Turner, supra note 102, at 166 n.8 (“Prior record has
consistently been shown to be the best predictor of future criminality.”).
104. Professor Kevin Reitz, Reporter for the MPC Sentencing Project, recently
suggested that even if risk assessment as applied is more reliable than trained professional
judgment, the false positive rate may be so high that basing the duration of a prison term on
risk prediction may not be defensible. Kevin R. Reitz, The “Traditional” Indeterminate
Sentencing Model, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra
note 1, at 270, 280–81 (discussing instruments used for parole release); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. e at 56 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (warning of
“notoriously high” error rates in predictions of future criminal behavior).
105. Paul Gendreau et al., supra note 102, at 588 (noting “variables such as age, criminal
history, companions, family factors, gender, social achievement, and substance abuse are
significant and potent predictors of recidivism”); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk
Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391,
413–23 (2006).
106. SLOBOGIN, supra note 100, at 105–06; Netter, supra note 92, at 712 (noting a study
that finds VCSC error rates and criticizing methodology); OSTROM ET AL., supra note 92, at
48 (observing that many assessment instruments actually used at sentencing omit age, gender,
employment, and marital status); Petersilia & Turner, supra note 102, at 167 (omitting factors
that are correlated with race from a model to predict recidivism reduced the accuracy of the
model by five to twelve percentage points); Slobogin, supra note 101, at 208–09, 283–84
(eliminating problematic variables and those associated with protected categories (i.e., race
and gender) reduces predictive power and also noting that some studies may not include
enough factors because samples are too small); Wilson, supra note 82, at 507–11 (noting postrelease variables that influence recidivism, such as a jurisdiction’s policy on when violations
require reincarceration, when violations are charged, and rehab/reentry policies). But see
Jennifer Skeem, Risk Technology in Sentencing: Testing the Promises and Perils (Commentary
on Hannah-Moffat, 2011), 30 JUST. Q. 297, 300 (2013); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
app. B at 131 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (arguing that “the predictive value of the socalled dynamic factors has yet to be demonstrated empirically”); Starr, supra note 94.
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basis for a prediction is criminal history, it is misleading to equate its
accuracy with that of the best risk assessment instruments.
Also, although research confirms that recidivism rates do increase as
the number of prior convictions increases beyond three or four, the
relationship between a single prior conviction and future crime is much
107
more tenuous.
For example, two years after release from their first
conviction, offenders aged forty-two or older are no more likely to
commit a crime than people with clean records; for those between
thirty-seven and forty-one years old, the rates converge after five
108
years. So maybe the old adage “Once a criminal, always a criminal”
might make sense if it was “Four times a criminal recently, probably a
criminal later,” but to assume that a single criminal conviction dooms a
person to a life of crime may be no more accurate than nineteenth
century attempts to predict future criminal behavior from jaw size.
The research confirming the relationship between past offending and
recidivism also does not use a consistent measure of recidivism.
Measures include any subsequent violent crime, felony arrest, felony
conviction, conviction for any crime including a misdemeanor, or
109
violation of a condition of supervised release.
A risk assessment
instrument generally reliable in predicting re-imprisonment for any
reason may not be a reliable method of forecasting the likelihood of
110
future violent behavior.
107. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 30–32 (“[R]esearch suggests that the relationship
between the number and nature of previous convictions and the likelihood of reoffending is
complex and attenuates more rapidly than is commonly believed.”); Shawn D. Bushway et al.,
The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect
Time to Redemption?, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 50–52 (2011) (finding a significant relationship
between the number of prior offenses and the likelihood of re-offending).
108. Bushway et al., supra note 107, at 51.
109. Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 277; JOAN PETERSILIA, CAL. POLICY RESEARCH
CTR., UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 73–74 (2006); see also MEASURING
RECIDIVISM, supra note 91, at 7 (“Supervision violations are the largest type of recidivism
behavior, accounting for an average 45 percent of recidivism across the CHCs.”); SLOBOGIN,
supra note 100, at 112 (stating that validation may count a minor assault as well as a more
serious crime); Slobogin, supra note 101, at 208 (noting that validation sometimes uses only
violation acts).
110. Other variation between research and applied risk prediction includes the use of
instruments validated for one population on a different population where the reliability of
predictions are either not tested or not accurate. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 100, at 111;
Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 280 (discussing how existing instruments based on males
are not applicable to women); Slobogin, supra note 101, at 208. Krauss notes that the very
limited efforts to test the predictive accuracy of the CHS in USSG suffer from great variation
based on the cohort of the population studied and that subjects studied differed from those
actually sentenced. Krauss, supra note 91, at 300. Several sources, including James Bonta et
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Repeat-offender laws and criminal history scores also do not
necessarily track the measures of past offending that research links to
111
recidivism. Juvenile history is often included, despite research
showing that most people desist from crime after late adolescence and
112
questioning the predictive value of juvenile offenses. Depending upon
the age of an offender, the recency of a prior conviction may
113
yet criminal history
dramatically impact its predictive capacity,
provisions typically do not vary with the age of the defendant, nor do
114
they always exclude prior convictions from decades earlier.
Arrests,
convictions, and sentence length are all used for assessing criminal
115
history, but each may carry a different predictive power. The type of
prior crime also matters. For example, property offenses are much

al., The Dangerous Offender Provisions: Are They Targeting the Right Offenders?, 40 CAN. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 377, 377 (1998), observe that instruments for nonsexual offenders do not do
well at predicting re-offending by sex offenders. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, The
Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique of California’s Habitual Criminal
Statute, 43 STAN. L. REV. 193, 236 (1990) (calling this defect in California’s law “scientifically
and morally suspect”).
111. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(3) (West 2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.42(f) (West Supp. 2013); see also Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., Second-Class Justice, First-Class
Punishment: The Use of Juvenile Records in Sentencing Adults, 81 JUDICATURE 206, 206
(1998).
112. Reitz, supra note 104, at 280 (discussing instruments used for parole release: “Some
states include arrests in the mix, while most register only convictions or past incarcerations,
and there are sharp difference of opinion on the use of juvenile records”); Elizabeth S. Scott
& Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile
Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 154 (1997); BUREAU OF JUST.
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS: A MIDDECADE STATUS REPORT 2 (1997) (while “[t]he vast majority of juveniles desist from
crime, . . . a small minority engag[e] in chronic and serious recidivistic behavior”).
113. Bushway et al., supra note 107, at 50–52; Tonry, supra note 68, at 42–43 (arguing
that confining people for property and violent offenses after they would have desisted from
crime in late teens and early twenties is inefficient and may be criminogenic; even active
career offenders end their careers in their thirties).
114. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21–4710(d)(3)–
(8) (2006) (providing some juvenile adjudications decay, but no decay period for adult
convictions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A–1340.14 (2011); 204 PA. CONS. STAT. § 303.6(c) (2005)
(limitations period only for juvenile history); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011); Dubber, supra note 110, at 208 (noting that under California’s
section 667 “a 30-year-old conviction carries the same weight as a 3-month-old conviction”);
Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME & JUST.
303, 356 (1997) (“most systems simply count all convictions within a ten- or fifteen-year
period,” trading ease of application for a loss of discrimination between offenders of variable
recidivism risk).
115. On the debate about whether to use arrests or noncharged conduct in criminal
history, see Tonry, supra note 2.
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116

more likely to be repeated than other offenses. But sentencing laws
and rules and guidelines often do not distinguish between types of
felonies. One set of guidelines equates those who solicit prostitution
117
with those convicted of robbery or manslaughter.
Some provisions
raise penalties for those with past misdemeanors and even deferred
118
adjudications.
These various problems suggest that although
sophisticated risk assessment instruments may generate predictions of
recidivism that are right more often than they are wrong, there is little
reason to expect that estimates based on prior convictions alone would
be as accurate.
2. Costs of Increasing Sentences Based on Predictions from Criminal
History: Exacerbating Racial Bias
A second problem is that even if using criminal history does help
somewhat in predicting recidivism, any resulting marginal reduction in
crime may not be worth its costs. Recent research has shown that
reliance on criminal history exacerbates past racial bias in investigation,
119
arrest, prosecution, and sentencing.
Bernard Harcourt in his book
116. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 15; EDWARD ZAMBLE & VERNON L. QUINSEY, THE
CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM PROCESS 96 (1997) (showing those whose new convictions involved
only property had longer but less violent criminal histories); OSTROM ET AL., supra note 92,
at 79; Tonry, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that one of the changes to the well-known risk
assessment instruments on which the USSG CHS score is based that has increased the rates of
false positives was removing factors that had successfully identified those less serious crimes
most likely to be repeated, such as auto theft and check fraud).
117. Michael Tonry, Proportionality, Parsimony, and Interchangeability of Punishments,
in WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT 217, 227 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2011); see also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING,
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 100 (2007) (noting that focus is on the number of
priors with little distinction made between the types of offenders).
118. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (some misdemeanors); United States v. Morillo,
178 F.3d 18, 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a “continuance without finding” disposition
under Mass. Gen. Law, Ch. 278, § 18, counts as a prior sentence for federal sentencing
purposes because it is an admission of guilt); Rudman v. Leavitt, 578 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 (D.
Md. 2008) (holding that probation before judgment under Maryland law is considered a prior
conviction for purposes of federal sentencing). But see MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 6.02B(9) (Discussion Draft No. 4, 2012) (arguing that a deferred adjudication may not be
considered a part of the accused’s criminal history in later proceedings).
119. Tonry, supra note 1, at 77 (“Because black offenders are arrested more often and at
younger ages than whites, they are more often affected by prior record increments.”);
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 7; Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Characterizing Criminal
Careers, 237 SCI. 985, 990 (“[R]acial discrimination in arrest, sentencing, or parole decisions,
which is unambiguously prohibited on normative grounds, is also empirically wrong as a basis
for decisions about active offenders.”); Tonry, supra note 2. But compare Skeem, supra note
106, at 301 (arguing that criminal history does not raise the same race effects as other factors),
with Oleson, supra note 95, at 1396.
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Against Prediction calls this the “ratchet effect” and condemns risk
120
prediction at all phases of the criminal justice process for this reason.
121
Nearly one in three adults in this country has a criminal history record,
and as of 2007, the percentage of blacks under correctional control in
122
the United States was more than four times that of whites. Professor
Richard Frase found that in Minnesota two-thirds of racial disparities in
imprisonment rates resulted from the weighting of criminal history
123
factors in sentencing.
Since California adopted its three strikes law,
black defendants have received significantly longer prison sentences
124
Just a few months ago, a bill to loosen
than whites and Latinos.
criminal history requirements for exempting federal drug offenders from
mandatory minimums was introduced in Congress, and U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder ordered federal prosecutors to consider ignoring
recidivism provisions, stating: “In some cases . . . recidivist enhancement
statutes have resulted in unduly harsh sentences and perceived or actual
125
disparities that do not reflect our Principles of Federal Prosecution.”
120. HARCOURT, supra note 117, at 147.
121. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE 27 n.4 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_convi
ction.pdf [hereinafter EEOC] (citing Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest
From Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25–26 (2012)).
122. Id. at 37 n.74 (citing PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 4, at 5 (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/u
ploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf); WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL.,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2006, at 8 (2007).
123. FRASE, supra note 88, at 216; Jamie Fellner, Race and Drugs, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION (Sandra M. Bucerius & Michael
Tonry eds.) (2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Race%
20and%20Drugs.pdf (concluding that any use of recidivist enhancements increased racial
disparity, but using arrest data in particular creates greater disparity than using past
sentences); see also Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 277, 279, 282; Cassia Spohn et al., The
Effect of Prior Record in Sentencing Research: An Examination of the Assumption that Any
Measure Is Adequate, 4 JUST. Q. 287, 289 (1987) (“[M]easures of incarceration had the most
uniform effects on the sentences of both blacks and whites, while other measures had
opposite effects for blacks and for whites or had no strong positive associations with sentence
severity.”); JOHN PAWASARAT & LOIS M. QUINN, WISCONSIN’S MASS INCARCERATION OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES: WORKFORCE CHALLENGES FOR 2013, at 15 (2013) (“The
incarceration levels [for black men from Milwaukee County] in the 2003–2008 period are
nearly four times those seen in 1990 before drug law changes, truth-in-sentencing, mandatory
sentences, and three-strikes laws were broadly imposed.”).
124. SCOTT EHLERS ET AL., RACIAL DIVIDE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF
CALIFORNIA’S THREE STRIKES LAW ON AFRICAN AMERICANS AND LATINOS 2 (2004).
125. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to the U.S. Attorneys and Assistant
Attorney Gen. for the Criminal Div. 1, 3 (Aug. 12, 2013) (noting that a Prior Felony
Information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 should not be filed “unless the defendant is involved
in conduct that makes the case appropriate for severe sanctions”).
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This problem is so pronounced that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission recently warned employers that using criminal
history data in hiring decisions could expose them to disparate impact
126
lawsuits.
C. Just Deserts in Proportion to Blame: A Mismatch with RepeatOffender Penalties
For these reasons and more, many retributivists would forbid any
consideration of criminal history in setting sentences. Prior acts, they
argue, are unrelated to the only thing that matters in sentencing: the
blameworthiness of the offender for the offense of conviction. Some
retribution purists would abandon consideration of criminal history as
127
entirely inconsistent with these principles.
Others committed to the
sentencing philosophy of “just deserts” have argued that repeat
offenders are actually more blameworthy because they are more defiant
128
and incorrigible, or because they had already learned that their
129
behavior was wrong.
Too often current laws fail to advance either theory. To indicate
defiance, an additional crime would require willful law breaking, but of
course a defendant may be convicted even if he believes he is complying

126. See EEOC, supra note 121; see also John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by A Metaphor: A
Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1097 (2013) (noting
that although relatively few drug arrests result in incarceration, when later arrested for a
nondrug offense prior drug convictions may lead to a longer sentence, or to incarceration
rather than probation, and suggesting “it may be more productive for reformers [interested in
reducing prison populations] to focus on changing repeat-offender laws, not drug-sentencing
laws”).
127. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.07 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007);
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 466 (2000) (noting that there are
“serious ethical issues in punishing a person more severely on the basis of past crimes already
once punished”); HARCOURT, supra note 117, at 238; ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR
FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF
CRIMINALS 77–91 (1987) (arguing that only a modest increment of additional punishment for
prior offenses is permissible in just-deserts theory); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 9 (collecting
proponents of what he calls “flat rate” sentencing, based only on crime of conviction and not
varying with the character of the defendant); RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS:
SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 67–73 (1979); Stephen J. Morse, Preventive
Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 66 (2004).
128. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 37; Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational
Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 689, 705 (1995) (terming this theory a “penalty for
recalcitrance” or “insufficient obsequiousness” unrelated to “moral desert”); Paul H.
Robinson, Criminal Law Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 287, 313
(2001).
129. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 88.
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130

with the law.
Both of these theories of increased culpability also
would logically exclude offenses that involve less than knowing
behavior, yet repeat-offender premiums are imposed for negligent,
131
impulsive, and reckless action too.
Nor are increased sentences
conditioned upon a finding that the defendant committed the same
132
offense again.
Most importantly, for higher penalties to make sense for repeat
offenders under either of these greater-culpability theories, the latest
offense must have been committed after conviction and punishment for
the earlier offense. Many repeat-offender provisions punish defendants
who have “prior” convictions not because their latest criminal acts were
committed after a previous sentence but only because prosecutors
decided to prosecute sequentially multiple counts arising from a single
133
incident. Some statutes explicitly authorize repeat-offender penalties
for defendants convicted of multiple offenses committed at the same
time or even for defendants whose prior conviction was for an offense
134
that was committed after the charged offense.
In sum, legislatures,
commissions, and courts could do a better job of matching actual repeatoffender punishments with both theory and research.

130. Id. at 42.
131. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality and Progressive Loss of Mitigation: Further
Reflections, in Roberts & von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 1, 5 (“[A] mark of much recidivism
(especially repeat-minor offending) is impulsiveness.”); Michael Tonry, The Questionable
Relevance of Previous Convictions to Punishments for Later Crimes, in Roberts & von Hirsch,
supra note 2, at 91.
132. Youngjae Lee, Repeat Offenders and the Question of Desert, in Roberts & von
Hirsch, supra note 2, at 49, 56.
133. Caldwell, supra note 4, at 589–90; Dubber, supra note 110, at 228–29 (criticizing this
aspect of California’s law); see also Reitz, supra note 2, at 143–48 (discussing the difficulty of
reconciling the recidivist premium with the bulk discount).
134. FRASE, supra note 88, at 178–79; Richard S. Frase, Prior-Conviction Sentencing
Enhancements: Rationales and Limits Based on Retributive and Utilitarian Proportionality
Principles and Social Equality Goals, in Roberts & von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 117, 117–19;
Kenneth G. Schuler, Note, Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multiple
Punishment Doctrine, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2220, 2228–29 nn.59–60 (1993); see also Deal v.
United States, 508 U.S. 129, 135 (1993) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) to require only a
jury finding of guilt for conviction and not that an offender commit an additional crime after
another conviction); Commonwealth v. Gehris, 54 A.3d 862, 867 (Pa. 2012) (reviewing
authority and interpreting statute to bar second-offender sentence when that sentence is
based on other counts in a multiple-count complaint); Commonwealth v. Jarowecki, 985 A.2d
955, 968–69 (Pa. 2009) (same); Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 37, United States v. Clark,
No. 12-30377 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2013). See generally Cynthia L. Sletto, Annotation,
Chronological or Procedural Sequence of Former Convictions as Affecting Enhancement of
Penalty Under Habitual Offender Statutes, 7 A.L.R.5th 263 (1992).
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IV. THE PROCESS FOR CHARGING AND PROVING PRIOR CONVICTIONS
THAT RAISE SENTENCE RANGES: A CHANGING CONSTITUTIONAL
LANDSCAPE
A separate controversy is whether the process for imposing these
penalties violates the Constitution.
Specifically, when a statute
increases the range of punishment for prior offenders above that
available for first offenders, lower courts have relied upon Supreme
Court precedent in holding that the prior conviction may be treated as a
sentencing factor, determined only after conviction, with no formal
notice, by a judge who finds it more likely than not. But this should, and
likely will, change. There is no adequate justification for denying the
accused his right to notice and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a
jury of the fact of prior conviction if that fact raises the range of
punishment he faces. In other words, a prior conviction that aggravates
the range of punishment must, like any other fact with this effect, be
treated as an element of what is essentially a greater offense. This Part
examines the origins, purported justifications, and probable demise of
the rule that allows courts to treat prior convictions differently than any
other fact triggering increased punishment.
A. Apprendi v. New Jersey, Alleyne v. United States, and the Exception
for Prior Convictions
In the summer of 2000, the Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New
135
Jersey held that a fact that increases the maximum penalty a defendant
faces for a crime is an element of that crime, and a defendant has a right
to have a jury find that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. A sentence
longer than what is authorized for the offense of conviction, based on a
judge’s determination that a fact is probably true, violates the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury finding of every element, said the Supreme
136
Court. This past summer, in Alleyne v. United States, the Court
overruled a 2002 decision in which it had refused to extend Apprendi’s
principle to facts that increase only the minimum sentence. Element
status for facts raising a sentencing range brings with it at least three
rights: the right to jury determination, the right to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and, at least in the federal courts, the right to
137
inclusion of the allegation in the indictment.
135. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
136. 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
137. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002) (“In Apprendi, we held that
‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
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But in every one of its many decisions applying Apprendi, the Court
has carefully stepped around statutes that raise punishment ranges for
prior offenders. It has done this by consistently including in each
declaration of the Apprendi rule an exemption for the particular fact of
138
prior conviction. Yet none of the many cases stating the Apprendi rule
have actually involved a recidivist penalty, so the exception remains
dicta.
Most recently, the Alleyne decision included a footnote
explaining that the Court declined to revisit the exception because the
139
parties had not contested it. Plenty of other defendants are contesting

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the
indictment.” (internal citations omitted)). When applying the Apprendi rule in state cases,
the Court has addressed only jury and burden issues, not charging. States have divided over
whether the Sixth Amendment requires such facts to be included in the initial charge. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 5 CRIM. PROC. § 19.3(a), § 26.4(i) n.200.9 (3d ed. 2013)
(recognizing that most of the more than a dozen decisions addressing this issue have held that
Apprendi facts are not elements that must be included along with the original charge under
federal constitutional law, collecting authority, and noting that some argue that the notice
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is satisfied by notice other than inclusion in the
charging instrument, while others seem to reject the very premise of the Court’s doctrine,
reasoning that the different levels of punishment do not create separate offenses and that the
severity of punishment for a single offense is not an appropriate subject of grand jury review);
see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.07B cmt. c & reporter’s note c at 301, 314
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (noting that “[c]onsistent with all state legislation on the
subject, § 7.07B does not treat jury-sentencing facts as elements of offenses. The provision
does assume, however, that Due Process guarantees in federal and state law will require that
the defendant receive timely notice of any alleged jury-sentencing fact in the case, and must
be given adequate opportunity to prepare to challenge the existence of the fact in a jury
proceeding,” recognizing that “many jurisdictions have adopted procedures outside of the
charging instrument to ensure that the government gives adequate notice to the defendant
that a jury-sentencing fact will been raised”) (collecting authority).
138. See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 281–82 (2007) (“Other than a
prior conviction, we held in Apprendi, ‘any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” (internal citation omitted)); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563,
563 n.3 (2010) (“[T]he statutory scheme comports with Almendarez-Torres, in which we
explained that the Constitution does not require treating recidivism as an element of the
offense.” (internal citations omitted)); United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 224, 235 (2010)
(noting that “one exception has been established” and that “the recidivist provisions in [18
U.S.C. § 924](C)(i) and (ii) . . . are typically sentencing factors”); James v. United States, 550
U.S. 192, 214 n.8 (2007) (“To the extent that James contends that the simple fact of his prior
conviction was required to be found by a jury, his position is baseless. James admitted the
fact of his prior conviction in his guilty plea, and in any case, we have held that prior
convictions need not be treated as an element of the offense for Sixth Amendment
purposes.”).
139. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 n.1 (2013) (“Because the parties do
not contest that decision’s vitality, we do not revisit it for purposes of our decision today.”).
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it, and a majority of justices may be ready to scrap it. Here is why they
should.
B. No Clear Historical Basis for the Exception
First, the historical record, so crucial to the Court in all of its
Apprendi cases, does not support exempting prior convictions from the
Apprendi rule. As for charging practice, in the late 1700s, there appear
to be no decisions departing from the common law rule that required
the initial charge to allege any prior offense that increased punishment.
Courts continued to follow the rule throughout the nineteenth century,
except for a handful of states that opted to permit prior convictions to
be alleged after conviction of the charged offense if those prior offenses
had not been alleged in the initial charging instrument and a defendant’s
140
first offender status was debunked in prison.
141
Eventually, in 1912 in Graham v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court
addressed this alternative procedure. After Graham had pleaded guilty
to larceny and was sentenced to five years in prison, he was charged, in a
separate information, of having been convicted twice before. A jury
found that allegation proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and he was
resentenced to life in prison. The Court reasoned that this process was a
rational approach for the state to adopt in order to deal with those
142
recognized as former offenders only after they were admitted to prison
and concluded that omitting the prior offense allegation from the initial
indictment was not a federal constitutional problem, reiterating that
143
states need not use indictments at all.
After Graham, more states
adopted this approach, some of them placing no time limit on the delay
in bringing the new allegation and lengthening an offender’s
144
incarceration. But this departure from the common law rule affected
140. The states departing from the common law rule prior to the Court’s decision in
Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912), were Massachusetts in 1817, see supra notes
26–29 and accompanying text; Virginia in 1819; South Carolina in 1832; West Virginia, which
adopted the Virginia practice when it became its own state in 1860, see Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448, 449–50 (1962); and Kansas, which became a state in 1859. Both Louisiana and
Maine for a time allowed post-conviction allegations of repeat-offender status, but this
position was later repudiated by the courts in each state. For a listing of 19th Century
authority in each state, see infra Appendix.
141. 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
142. Id. at 587.
143. Id. at 627 (noting that states are free to use information rather than indictment to
charge offenses and citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Brown v. New Jersey,
175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899); and Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 584 (1900)).
144. See infra Appendix.
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no more than a handful of states until 1912 and was not followed in the
145
federal courts where the Bill of Rights was fully applicable.
Such a
limited development is nothing like the established historical practices
that have influenced the Court in its prior Apprendi decisions.
As for the right to have a jury decide prior-offense status, that was
the law in virtually every federal and state jurisdiction, from the
146
Founding past World War II.
As late as 1946, only Alabama and
147
Kansas allowed a judge to make this determination instead of a jury.
Whenever a defendant pleaded guilty (and even after conviction by jury
trial in the handful of states where repeat status could be charged after
conviction), a new jury was empaneled to consider the allegation.
Otherwise, when the defendant contested the allegation, it was the same
145. Federal courts, testing the application of the federal repeat-offender statutes passed
as part of Prohibition, consistently treated prior convictions as elements of an aggravated
offense. See, e.g., Hefferman v. United States, 50 F.2d 554, 555–57 (3d Cir. 1931); Jacobs v.
United States, 24 F.2d 890, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (“In a case where a party is proceeded against
for a second or third offense under the statute, and the sentence prescribed is different from
the first by reason of its being a second or third offense, the fact thus relied on must be
averred in the indictment.”); Klein v. United States, 14 F.2d 35, 36–37 (1st Cir. 1926);
McCarren v. United States, 8 F.2d 113, 114 (7th Cir. 1925) (stating that a prosecutor is
required to allege in the indictment or information that defendant has previously been
convicted of a violation of the National Prohibition Act); Massey v. United States, 281 F. 293,
298 (8th Cir. 1922) (“The accused is entitled to have the exact charge against him stated in the
indictment or information, and to have the verdict of the jury upon the fact of a prior
conviction for the same offense, and of his identity with the person so convicted, and it is the
duty of the government which prosecutes to allege and prove the existence of the prior
conviction of the accused as a fact that may cause a severer penalty to be imposed.”); Singer
v. United States, 278 F. 415, 419–20 (3d Cir. 1922) (stating that inclusion in the charge was
required even if Congress did not so intend); United States v. Noel, 51 F.2d 139, 141 (S.D.
Ala. 1931) (holding that a district attorney is required to allege a previous conviction); United
States ex rel. Manchbach v. Moore, 2 F.2d 988, 989 (E.D. N.Y. 1924). Congress had passed
one other statute boosting penalties for prior offenders before the National Prohibition Act, a
1919 statute punishing second offense mail theft, see supra note 59, but no cases could be
located discussing that particular provision.
146. As the Court observed in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 556 (1967), as of 1967,
“The common-law procedure for applying recidivist statutes, . . . which requires allegations
and proof of past convictions in the current trial, is, of course, the simplest and best known
procedure.”
See generally Annotation, Constitutionality and Construction of Statute
Enhancing Penalty for Second or Subsequent Offense, 58 A.L.R. 20 (1929); Brown, supra note
52; Harold Dubroff, Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 332 (1965); David S.
Sidikman, Note, The Pleading and Proof of Prior Convictions in Habitual Criminal
Prosecutions, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1958).
147. See Note, Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 238,
241 (1948) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-107(a) (1945)) (stating all but one made it a jury
question and only Kansas allowed trial to the court); see also infra Alabama and Kansas
authority listed in Appendix. By 1968, five additional states had authorized judicial findings.
See Dubroff, supra note 146, at 347 n.89 (listing statutes from Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, and Oregon).
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jury that decided the other elements of the offense.
And there is
evidence that juries sometimes chose to nullify these harsh laws, rather
than apply them. Observers reported more than one case in which the
jury, despite fingerprints and other “unmistakable evidence” that a
defendant was indeed a multiple offender, “decided upon its oath that
149
the prisoner was a first offender.”
Finally, whenever a prior conviction would increase the sentence
beyond that available for a first offender, the jury was instructed that it
had to find that the government established beyond a reasonable doubt
150
that the offender was the same person who had been convicted earlier.
Justice Cardozo, writing in a 1932 case in which the jury’s consideration
of the defendant’s prior convictions took place after the filing of a
supplemental information, explained why:
The answer made to the “accusation” by the verdict of the jury
may mean that the defendant will be a free man after a brief
term of confinement, or may mean, on the other hand, that he
will be a prisoner for life. If the previous convictions had been
charged in an indictment, there is no doubt that they must have
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, for they would then
have been elements affecting the grade of the offense. We find
no token of a purpose to abate the measure of the proof upon an
inquiry as to the same elements after guilt has been adjudged.
The genius of our criminal law is violated when punishment is
enhanced in the face of a reasonable doubt as to the facts leading
to enhancement. If that genius is to be expelled, there should be
148. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 268 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Court’s hostility to jury determination of prior convictions is quite simply at odds
with the manner in which recidivism laws have historically been treated in this country.”).
Thus, even if the very limited variation in the nineteenth century regarding charging would
justify some flexibility for prior conviction allegations under the Sixth Amendment’s notice
requirement, it would not justify similar flexibility for the jury requirement.
149. THE BAUMES LAW 142–43, 164 (Julia E. Johnson ed., 1929). Consider also Swann
v. State, 1 A. 872, 872–73 (Md. 1885) (holding, in a case where proof of second offense was
clear, that it was error for judge to have responded to jury’s question of whether it could find
a verdict for a first offense by instructing the jury that it either must acquit or find second
offense, but harmless).
150. See Dubroff, supra note 146, at 341–42 (“Where . . . the defendant denies that he
was the person previously convicted, it is the usual rule that the state must prove identity just
as it must prove guilt for an ordinary crime. There is likewise little conflict among the states
as to the burden of proof the prosecution must sustain, most jurisdictions requiring the
criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also
Spencer, 385 U.S. at 574; M. C. Dransfield, Annotation, Evidence of Identity for Purposes of
Statute as to Enhanced Punishment in Case of Prior Conviction, 11 A.L.R.2d 870 (1950)
(collecting cases from federal courts and twenty-five states).
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a clear announcement of the purpose to drive it forth from the
151
dwelling it has inhabited so long.
C. Precedent: Why Almendarez-Torres and Other Cases Do Not Support
the Exception
So much for history. Precedent should not prop up this exception
152
either. The case of Almendarez-Torres v. United States is considered
153
the chief authority for the prior-conviction exception, but its basis is
no longer viable. The defendant in that case turned up in a Texas jail
after he had been deported following a burglary conviction and was
charged with reentering the United States illegally. His indictment did
not specify whether he was being charged under subsection (a) of the
criminal statute that stated that the maximum sentence was two years or
subsection (b) that provided for up to twenty years if reentry occurred
154
after being convicted of an aggravated felony. The defendant pleaded
155
guilty, admitted his prior burglary conviction, but then argued at
sentencing that because his indictment had not alleged his prior
conviction, an element of the greater offense defined in subsection (b),
156
he faced at most two years.
The judge disagreed, sentenced him to
seven years, and the Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision upheld
that sentence. Congress intended that the prior conviction that
triggered the eighteen-year increase would be a sentencing factor that
the judge could find after conviction, the Court reasoned, not an
element of a greater offense. Two years later, when the Court
announced in Apprendi that legislatures cannot bypass the right to a

151. People v. Reese, 179 N.E. 305, 305–06, 308 (N.Y. 1932) (internal citations omitted).
152. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
153. Indeed, Justice Thomas has written that “the exception to trial by jury for
establishing ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ finds its basis not in the Constitution, but in a
precedent of this Court.” Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200, 1202 (2006)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224), denying cert. to 168 F.
App’x 616 (5th Cir. 2006).
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2), (b)(2) (2012).
155. Brief for the United States at 5–6, Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224 (1998) (No. 96-6839).
156. By the time sentencing rolled around, the government and probation officer had
realized the maximum sentence under subsection (b) was twenty years, not ten, and had
modified the presentence report to reflect this. But the defendant objected and argued that
the maximum he faced was actually two years because he had pleaded guilty to an indictment
that had charged the offense defined by subsection (a) and had not alleged his prior felony
conviction, an element of the greater offense defined by subsection (b). The district court
disagreed and sentenced him to just over seven years in prison and two years supervised
release. Id. at 7.
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jury trial by designating a fact that raises the maximum sentence as a
“sentencing factor” instead of an element, it expressly exempted the fact
of prior conviction, cited its decision in Almendarez-Torres, and the
“prior-conviction exception” to the Sixth Amendment rule in Apprendi
was born.
The Court was wrong to carve out this prior-conviction exception in
Apprendi, and it was wrong in Almendarez-Torres. Justice Stephen
Breyer’s opinion for the Court in Almendarez-Torres rested on several
prior decisions, but they do not support the holding. The Court leaned
157
158
on Graham from 1912 and Oyler v. Boles from 1962, both involving
defendants who had been convicted and sentenced under the
supplemental information approach used in Virginia and West
159
Virginia. In both cases, the Court rejected claims that failing to allege
a prior conviction in the initial indictment violated the due process
protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. It concluded that
the common law practice of including prior conviction allegations in the
charging instrument and proving them to the jury was optional in the
160
states.
Importantly, both cases construed the limitations of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause on states, and not the scope of the
Indictment Clause in the Fifth Amendment at stake in Almendarez161
Torres, which does not apply in state courts. More importantly, both
cases were decided before the Court declared that the Constitution
162
required state courts to provide either reasonable notice of the charge
157. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text discussing Graham v. West Virginia,
224 U.S. 616 (1912).
158. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
159. In Oyler, the defendant’s sentence was boosted from an eighteen-year maximum to
life after he was charged with being a recidivist. Unlike Graham, whose sentence was also
raised to life only after the prior offense allegations were proven to a jury, Oyler admitted
that he was the same person named in the habitual information. Id. at 450.
160. Id. at 454 (“The petitioners’ claim that they were deprived of due process because
of inadequate opportunity to contest the habitual criminal accusation must be rejected in
these cases.”); Graham, 224 U.S. at 625 (“It cannot be said that the prisoner was deprived of
due process of law. . . . Provision for a separate, and subsequent, determination of his identity
with the former convict has not been regarded as a deprivation of any fundamental right.”).
161. Graham, 224 U.S. at 623, 627 (relying on Hurtado in rejecting the state prisoner’s
claim and noting that states are not bound by requirements of the Federal Constitution).
162. The Sixth Amendment right to reasonable notice of the charge was not clearly
recognized for state defendants until 1967, five years after the decision in Oyler; although
dictum suggesting this appeared in 1948. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 137, at § 2.6(a)
(noting the Court’s reliance in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20 (1967), on the dictum in
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), that had treated the notice guarantee as equal in
standing to those other rights, was viewed as indicating that a person’s Sixth Amendment
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163

or the right to a jury trial for criminal cases.
The majority in Oyler
also noted that an alternative basis for its decision was that the
164
defendant failed to raise his objection on time.
Two other cases relied on by the Court in Almendarez-Torres have
165
since been overruled, one just this past summer by Alleyne. The Court
also quoted several other cases stating that a prior conviction allegation
“goes as to the punishment only” and is not an element of the offense,
but all of those cases involved claims that increasing a sentence for a
166
prior conviction was improper punishment for the prior offense.
In
right “to reasonable notice of the charge against him” also was to be selectively
incorporated). The Oyler dissenters also pointed out that Graham was decided before the
Court had broadened the scope of habeas review of state decisions. Oyler, 368 U.S. at 463 n.2
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
163. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (declaring that the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial is part of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to every state felony defendant).
164. Oyler, 368 U.S. at 454; see also id. at 458 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Counsel could
have requested a continuance in order to look into the validity of the previous convictions or
other possible defenses to the recidivist charges, or, if there was any doubt, to establish the
identities of the previous offenders. They chose not to do so, and I think this choice
forecloses the petitioners’ claims that they were not given adequate notice and opportunity to
prepare a defense.”); L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12, at 618 (stating that Oyler
obscured rather than clarified the question of advance notice).
165. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (citing Walton v. Arizona,
497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151
(2013)).
166. The phrase was first used by the Court in 1895. Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673,
677 (1895) (“go as to the punishment only” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Moore
and in McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 331 (1901), the Court addressed claims that the
defendant had been punished twice for the prior offense, that such double punishment
violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that by counting prior convictions
that preceded the passage of the prior offender law, the state had violated ex post facto
principles in the Federal Constitution. In each case, the Court explained that the state had
not violated the Fourteenth Amendment, which was no surprise, considering at the time that
Amendment was believed to provide essentially no protection for state criminal defendants
other than to bar deliberate differential treatment by race. Federal double jeopardy
protections, for example, were not applied to the states until 1969. See Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). Indeed, to emphasize that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause had no bearing on state criminal justice, the Court in Moore cited its earlier
decision upholding a miscegenation conviction under an Alabama statute that also punished
second-offense fornication more severely than for the first offense. Moore, 159 U.S. at 678
(citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882)).
The Court in Almendarez-Torres also relied on Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 55
(1914) and Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948). In Carlesi, the Court rejected a
defendant’s claim that the subsequent pardon of an offense barred its use as a prior
conviction boosting a sentence. Carlesi admitted his prior conviction, and the case presented
no issue of pleading or proof. Carlesi, 233 U.S. at 56. In Gryger, the defendant also admitted
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each, the Court explained that the heightened punishment was not
punishment for the prior conviction but, instead, “a stiffened penalty for
167
the latest crime.”
None of these cases would be affected by
abandoning the exception and overruling Almendarez-Torres.
One holding of the Supreme Court that would be doomed should
168
the Court overrule Almendarez-Torres is Monge v. California. Monge
was a three-strikes case decided just three months after AlmendarezTorres by the same five to four majority. The Court acknowledged that
if Monge’s prior strike had been an element, then retrial would have
been barred because an appellate court had found the state’s evidence
of the strike was insufficient. Because of Almendarez-Torres, however,
the Court concluded that the prior conviction was not an element and
169
consequently retrial was not barred.
With nothing but Almendarez170
Torres to stand on, Monge will and should fall.
D. Policy: Managing Jury Prejudice
Nor should policy arguments keep the exception alive. The justices
have worried that allowing a prosecutor to prove prior convictions that
raise the sentence range in jury trials like other elements would be
171
unfair to defendants. This could be a serious dilemma for defendants,
his prior conviction but raised ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges to the sentence
increase for his prior conviction. Gryger, 334 U.S. at 729–30. The Court rejected Gryger’s
argument that the state denied him due process when it failed to appoint him counsel for his
trial on the prior conviction allegations, explaining that it had just held that states have no
federal constitutional obligation to provide counsel to defendants who pled guilty to
noncapital offenses. Id. at 731.
167. Id. at 732 (emphasis added).
168. 524 U.S. 721 (1998).
169. Id. at 729–34.
170. If the Court is willing to decouple the treatment under the indictment clause and
the right to notice from the right to a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt, then it
could abolish the exception from the jury and burden of proof protections and leave
Almendarez-Torres’s holding on indictments standing. But a majority appears to believe that
element status under the Indictment Clause determines element status under the Jury Clause
and vice versa. The Alleyne opinion, for example, repeatedly referred to the concept of
notice and to elements that must be included in the indictment. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at
2159–60; see also id. at 2164 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting “prosecutors are perfectly
able to ‘charge facts upon which a mandatory minimum sentence is based in the indictment
and prove them to a jury.’ Indeed, even with Harris in place, prosecutors already sometimes
charge such facts and seek to prove them to a jury” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Harris
v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 581 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting))). There is considerable
disagreement in the states regarding the notice required for facts that fall within the Apprendi
rule. See supra note 137 (collecting authority).
171. E.g., Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234–35 (“[T]he introduction of evidence of a
defendant’s prior crimes risks significant prejudice. Even if a defendant’s stipulation were to
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as research has shown that jurors will “infer guilt directly from the
172
existence of prior convictions.”
Although this was not the original
reason for the supplemental information procedure when first adopted
in Virginia and Massachusetts, as noted above in Part I, it later became
173
one of its most popular justifications. But the risk that courts will be
unable to manage jury prejudice given the need to prove a prior
conviction is not a constitutional problem, depriving a defendant of the
right to notice and proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an element
174
clearly is. In the 1967 decision Spencer v. Texas, the defendant, who
had received timely notice and a jury trial on the prior conviction
allegations, argued that due process required states to abandon onestage habitual offender trials and use bifurcated proceedings. The Court
disagreed, observing that “[t]he common-law procedure for applying
recidivist statutes . . . which requires allegations and proof of past
convictions in the current trial, is, of course, the simplest and best
175
known procedure.” The Court was “unwilling” to mandate that states
change this basic process. Although several justices have expressed the
176
belief that bifurcation is the better approach, the Court has yet to
mandate it as a matter of constitutional law. It has held, however, that
in federal criminal trials, “when proof of convict status is at issue”
before a jury, and a defendant offers to stipulate to that status, the
Federal Rules of Evidence bar admission of additional information
177
about the prior conviction.
keep the name and details of the previous offense from the jury, see Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 178–79 (1997), jurors would still learn, from the indictment, the judge, or
the prosecutor, that the defendant had committed an aggravated felony. . . . [W]e do not
believe, other things being equal, that Congress would have wanted to create this kind of
unfairness in respect to facts that are almost never contested.” (internal citation omitted)).
172. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 210; see also Nancy J. King, Juries and Prior
Convictions: Managing the Demise of the Prior Conviction Exception to Apprendi (draft
available from author).
173. See, e.g., Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738, 752–53 (1852); Tyson v.
Hening, 136 S.E.2d 832, 835–37 (Va. 1964) (citing McCallister v. Commonwealth, 161 S.E. 67
(Va. 1931)); State ex rel. Edelstein v. Huneke, 249 P. 784, 786 (Wash. 1926).
174. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
175. Id. at 563, 566.
176. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438–39 n.6 (1983); D. Michael Risinger,
John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”—Keeping the
Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 425 (1998) (noting that in
Spencer “the entire Supreme Court—majority, concurrence, and dissent alike—asserted that,
were the decision up to them on a legislative basis, they would adopt a two-stage procedure”).
177. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 190–91 (1997) (interpreting FRE 403 in a
922(g) trial: “The most the jury needs to know is that the conviction admitted by the
defendant falls within the class of crimes that Congress thought should bar a convict from

KING FINAL (6-30-14) (W-APP 11) (DO NOT DELETE)

560

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/2/2014 5:15 PM

[97:3

Moreover, it is not true that treating a penalty-raising prior
conviction as an element will irreparably impair the fairness of a jury
trial and increase even further the pressure to admit guilt. Courts and
legislatures have already developed and applied effective methods of
handling these issues. In many states prior convictions are jury
178
179
questions—in felony firearm cases, habitual offender cases, and cases
180
in which a prior conviction elevates a misdemeanor to a felony or a
181
lesser offense to a greater one.
Courts have managed the risk of
182
prejudice using bifurcation, requiring courts to accept stipulations to
183
limit what the jury hears about the prior conviction, allowing the
184
defendant to waive the jury for the prior-conviction element alone,
and barring any mention of a prior conviction if admitted by the
185
defendant, something like a partial plea of guilty. And they have been
186
doing this for nearly 200 years.
possessing a gun, and this point may be made readily in a defendant’s admission and
underscored in the court’s jury instructions.”).
178. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 2013 WL 5716805 (10th Cir. Oct. 22, 2013); State v.
Summers, 846 P.2d 490 (Wash. 1993).
179. King, supra note 172.
180. E.g., State v. Oster, 52 P.3d 26, 28–29 (Wash. 2002); State v. Benitez, 302 P.3d 877,
881 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Cochrane, 253 P.3d 95, 97 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
181. King, supra note 172.
182. Id. Bifurcation is already used to establish other facts deemed elements under
Apprendi. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.07B reporter’s note c at 314–15
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (listing authority for bifurcated proceedings, including KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21–4718(b)(2), (4) (2006); MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subd. 5(b) (2006); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A–1340.16(a)(1) (2006); ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 463, § 3(1), (4) (2006); and WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.94A.537(3), (4) (2006)).
183. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191–92; King, supra note 172.
184. California, Arizona, and Colorado retained the common law approach early on,
requiring the prior conviction be pleaded in the indictment, but permitting the defendant the
option of admitting the prior convictions and then barring any mention of them to the jury
during the trial of the charged offense, except for impeachment. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1004 (1939); People v. Wheatley, 26 P. 95, 96 (Cal. 1891) (describing prior law).
185. For a proposal to allow such selective waiver, see MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 7.07B(8) at 299 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
186. State v. Ferrone, 113 A. 452, 456 (Conn. 1921); Kilbourn v. State, 9 Conn. 560, 562–
63 (1833); L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12, at 614–15 (collecting authority); Sidikman,
supra note 146, at 215; McWhorter v. State, 44 S.E. 873, 874 (Ga. 1903) (construing a statute
providing for an enhanced punishment for subsequent offenses, the court held that, since the
allegation and proof of the prior conviction would tend to prejudice the rights of the
defendant, such allegation and proof must not be made until after the prisoner has been
convicted of the principal offense). Oregon replaced the common law practice with this
approach in 1927 for felonies. See Louise Denae Dale, Criminal Law: Procedure: Propriety of
Jury Consideration of Prior Offenses, 5 UCLA L. REV. 320, 320–21 (1958). A number of
states adopted this approach after World War II. L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12, at 615
n.92 (listing authority from Illinois, Maine, Utah, and Washington).
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As for the policy reason that initially led to the alternative charging
practice from which the exception grew, that reason has vanished. The
departure from the common law that allowed courts to increase
sentences based on criminal history alleged only after conviction was
built on the realities of a world that no longer exists, when a person’s
true identity was unknowable, before technology made accessing an
individual’s image, aliases, prints, and criminal history easy and cheap.
Identification today no longer must await commitment to prison.
Instead, it occurs in plenty of time for prosecutors to include prior
convictions that raise the sentence range in the initial charging
instrument. This information is routinely retrieved before or soon after
arrest. Law enforcement has been submitting and retrieving fingerprints
electronically through the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint
187
Identification System for about fifteen years.
The largest biometric
database in the world, it contains fingerprints and criminal histories for
more than seventy million people and reportedly matches fingerprints in
188
an average time of thirty minutes. All fifty states and the District of
189
Even though the
Columbia have been participating since 1993.
difficulty of identifying prior offenders may once have provided a reason
to allow prosecutors to postpone allegations and proof of criminal
190
history until after conviction, that reason no longer exists.
187. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 210–11 (2008).
188. Fingerprints & Other Biometrics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Dec. 13, 2013);
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited Dec. 13, 2013).
189. National Criminal History Improvement Program, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=47 (last visited Dec. 13, 2013).
190. There is yet another rationale that has been advanced to justify why prior
convictions, unlike other facts that raise sentencing ranges, need not be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt—namely, that the defendant already had those same protections
for the prior conviction. E.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (explaining that
the recidivism exception was permitted because “a prior conviction must itself have been
established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial
guarantees”); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2300 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the need to limit proof to prevent violations of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right
and arguing that, “When the modified categorical approach is used to decide whether ‘a jury
was actually required to find all the elements of [a] generic [offense],’ the defendant has
already enjoyed his Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of those elements”
(quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990))); Andrew Sokol, Juvenile
Adjudications as Elevating Factors in Subsequent Adult Sentencing and the Structural Role of
the Jury, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 791, 798–99 (2011) (stating that the exception can be
reconciled with the rationale of Apprendi only because the facts necessary to prove the prior
conviction in the first instance were presented to a jury that adjudged them true beyond a
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E. Stare Decisis: Eroded Doctrine, Shifting Votes
If all of the possible justifications for the prior-conviction exception
to the Apprendi rule are as weak as suggested here, the Court is unlikely
to decide that stare decisis warrants keeping it on life support any
longer. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader
191
Ginsburg have already made their opposition to the exception clear, so
its demise would require only two more votes from Justices Stephen
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, or Elena Kagan. In Alleyne, Justice Breyer
agreed to overrule as “anomalous” the Court’s decision exempting facts
that raise the minimum sentence from the Apprendi rule, a decision that
he had authored. The exception for prior convictions is equally, if not
more, anomalous, and he may be ready to overrule his prior opinion for
the Court in Almendarez-Torres as well. And the justification that
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan provided in Alleyne is equally applicable
here: When prosecutors are perfectly able to charge and prove these
facts to a jury, “stare decisis does not compel adherence to a decision
whose ‘underpinnings’ have been ‘eroded’ by subsequent developments
192
of constitutional law.”
The Court will have no shortage of cases
presenting the issue squarely, including a case remanded for
193
reconsideration in light of Alleyne.
reasonable doubt). But this “previously enjoyed rights” theory misses two key points. First, a
jury found someone guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but it may not have been this
defendant. Second, the theory fails entirely to address the lack of notice that results when a
defendant is asked to decide whether to contest an alleged offense before he learns that
because of a prior offense, conviction would carry a much longer sentence.
191. See, e.g., Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2294–95 (Thomas, J., concurring); Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26–28 (2005) (Thomas, J. concurring); Monge v. California, 524
U.S. 721, 737–39 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224, 247–70 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200
(2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224), denying cert. to 168
F. App’x 616 (5th Cir. 2006).
192. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2164–66 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring). Commentators and lower courts have detailed how the foundation for the rule
in Almendarez-Torres has been eroded as well. E.g., United States v. Adame-Orozco, 607
F.3d 647, 651 n.6 (10th Cir. 2010) (questioning the continuing viability of Almendarez-Torres);
Nichols v. United States, 563 F.3d 240, 243 n.1 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting a question concerning
the status of the Almendarez-Torres decision).
193. See United States v. Abrahamson, 731 F.3d 751, 752 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Because the
challenged enhancement of Abrahamson’s sentence was based solely on his prior felony drug
conviction, it continues to fall under the recidivism exception to the jury presentation
requirement that the Court recognized in Almendarez–Torres and left unchanged in
Alleyne.”). Understandably, courts of appeals are dutifully applying the Court’s precedent,
but often note its uncertain future. E.g., United States v. Torres–Alvarado, 416 F.3d 808, 810
(8th Cir. 2005) (“While it is unclear whether Almendarez–Torres and its felony exception will
remain good law, we are bound by Almendarez–Torres until the Supreme Court explicitly
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Discarding the exception for prior convictions will finally end cases
194
like David Appleby’s. Appleby pleaded guilty to two charges: thirdoffense DUI and third-offense driving on a revoked license. At his plea
proceeding, he was informed that his maximum sentence on each charge
was three years, for six years total. Not until after his plea and
conviction did the prosecuting attorney file a “recidivist information,”
which alleged that Appleby was “the same person who has been five
times previously convicted in the State of West Virginia for crimes
punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, [and] should be sentenced
195
to be confined in the state correctional facility for life.” A jury found
Appleby to be the same person who was convicted before, and the judge
sentenced him to life in prison. In 2010, a divided panel of the Fourth
Circuit, relying on Almendarez-Torres, rejected Appleby’s constitutional
challenge. But in dissent, Judge Traxler cut to the heart of the problem:
“Appleby was sentenced to life on the charges to which he pleaded
guilty after being told that he could be sentenced to no more than six
196
years.” It is time for the Court to require prosecutors in West Virginia
to do what prosecutors elsewhere seem to have no trouble doing:
determine whether the defendant is eligible for repeat-offender
punishment, decide whether to pursue that punishment, and provide
197
formal notice of that intent before conviction.
The Court cannot have it both ways: If a recidivist premium is not
additional punishment for the prior convictions, then it is punishment
for the charged offense, and the Constitution requires that the
defendant be informed of the actual maximum sentence he faces if
convicted of that charged offense, before he decides whether or not to
admit it. And whenever a higher sentence range turns on the presence
of a prior conviction, that fact must be alleged as part of the charge and
proven like any other element.
overrules it.” (internal citation omitted)).
194. See Appleby v. Warden, 595 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2010).
195. Id. at 534.
196. Id. at 544 (Traxler, J., dissenting) (emphasis altered).
197. Unlike most state courts, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 136, § 21.4(d), courts in
Washington and West Virginia have held that if application of a habitual criminal statute is
not automatic and would require commencement of a separate proceeding, then it is a
collateral consequence about which the defendant need not be warned. State v. Ward, 869
P.2d 1062, 1075 (Wash. 1994). Consider also United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 383–84
(2008) (“If the judge told the defendant that the maximum possible sentence was 10 years and
then imposed a sentence of 15 years based on ACCA [a provision authorizing a higher
sentence for those with prior convictions], the defendant would have been sorely misled and
would have a ground for moving to withdraw the plea.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
We need not eliminate the use of criminal history in allocating
punishment. Compared to alternative reasons for calibrating sentences,
criminal history will continue to have the advantage of relative
198
objectivity and widespread public support.
Escalated penalties for
prior offenders are here to stay. But the way in which these
punishments are applied will and should change.
State courts, legislatures, and sentencing commissions are already
revisiting the use of criminal history in sentencing to respond to the
Court’s expansion of the Apprendi rule, to incorporate risk assessment
199
tools, and to trim corrections costs.
Whenever these provisions are
considered, lawmakers should take the opportunity not only to bring
these rules into compliance with the Constitution, but also to revise
200
them in light of new information about their effects. For example, if a
criminal history aggravator is supposed to isolate the most violent
offenders for incapacitation, then the prior convictions that trigger
lengthier sentences should be narrowed to those that predict that type of
behavior, and parole or similar release provisions should be made
available for those who by anyone’s measure do not pose that risk, such
201
If the goal of a provision is
as the elderly and the very ill.
incarcerating those most likely to reoffend, then it should not increase
sentences based on features of criminal history that have little predictive
198. Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 290 (noting that the use of an objective measure
like criminal history is attractive for the same reason numerical guidelines and risk scores are:
they “standardize decision-making criteria, enhance the defensibility of decisions, and insure
that all the players in the system are working with the ‘same information,’” allowing judges
and prosecutors to defend their decisions to the electorate); see also Frase, supra note 134, at
119 (“[A]ccurate prior conviction information is more readily available than most other
evidence supporting the underlying rationales, and lends itself to simpler decision rules.”).
199. Such as in California, last year adopting Proposition 36 to narrow the scope of
eligible offenses and thereby reduce the number of nonviolent offenders sentenced to life
under these provisions. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2004); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.07 cmt. b at 135 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007)
(“[I]ncremental adjustments in variables such as criminal-history scoring may have substantial
aggregate effects.”).
200. See also Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 291 (urging legislators and courts to “pay
[more] attention to how, why, and based on what ‘evidence’ [they] can justify [deprivations]
of liberty based on risk scores” and past convictions); Petersilia & Turner, supra note 102, at
175 (calling for “researchers and policymakers in each state [to] discuss openly the objectives
of their guidelines and establish the correlation of commonly used factors with both
recidivism and race for their criminal populations . . . to address the equity issue in an
informed light”).
201. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.1 at 65 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2011).
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202

power. Changes like these may seem small, but the potential impact
can be significant, not only for those branded as convicted criminals
(although not literally any longer), but for everyone who bears the costs
of the use of incarceration to control criminal conduct.

202. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2010) (concluding that
additional criminal history points when offense occurred within two years of prior conviction
should be eliminated); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, COMPUTATION OF “RECENCY”
CRIMINAL HISTORY POINTS UNDER USSG 22 (2010) (finding that eliminating “recency
points” would have decreased predictive power only slightly but would have reduced the
average sentence of affected offenders by 16.3%).
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VI. APPENDIX: LAW ON CHARGING PRIOR CONVICTIONS, BY STATE
(YEAR STATEHOOD)
Alabama (1819) appeared to follow the common law rule on charging
prior convictions until 1944 even though, from 1909 on, it was one of the
very few states that permitted the judge (as opposed to the jury) to
determine whether the defendant had been convicted before. See
Johnson v. State, 130 So. 777, 778 (Ala. 1930) (citing Carson v. State, 19
So. 32 (Ala. 1896)) (noting that in order for a mandatory minimum
hard-labor sentence for second offenders to apply, the “indictment or
complaint in the case must aver a violation of the preceding section,
making the former conviction a material issue on the trial of the case”);
Lyles v. State, 88 So. 375, 376 (Ala. Ct. App. 1921) (noting Act of Jan.
25, 1919, no. 7, § 20, 1919 Ala. Acts 6, 17; Act of June 30, 1915, no. 1,
§§ 3, 14, 1915 Ala. Acts 1, 2, 6; and Act of Aug. 9, 1909, no. 7, § 3, 1909
Ala. Acts 8, 9–10); Rosenberg v. State, 59 So. 366, 368 (Ala. Ct. App.
1912). In 1944, the state’s high court held that more severe second and
third offender penalties could be imposed without an allegation of the
prior offense in the indictment upon a finding of the prior offense by a
judge at a “hearing, full and open, in which the defendant should be
present and represented by counsel, if he desires, and it should be tried
and reported as any other feature of the trial.” Yates v. State, 17 So. 2d
777, 779–80 (Ala. 1944) (internal citations omitted).
Arkansas (1836) followed the common law rule on charging prior
convictions as late as 1951, although cases since then allow the state to
amend the charge to add prior conviction allegations after trial begins.
See Finch v. State, 556 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Ark. 1977) (permitting
amendment during trial); Robbins v. State, 242 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Ark.
1951) (collecting authority requiring allegation of prior offenses); Hettle
v. State, 222 S.W. 1066, 1067 (Ark. 1920) (reversing conviction where
indictment did not charge a second offense, noting that “the offense of
illegal cohabitation is a graded crime, and the fact of whether it was a
first, second, or third offense is an element in the punishment thereof”
because “[e]very indictment, for whatever offense, must set out all the
facts which in law may influence the punishment for the commission
thereof” (quoting Kightlinger v. State, 150 S.W. 690, 690 (Ark. 1912))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. State, 620 S.W.2d 300,
301–02 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) (permitting the amendment of the
information on date of trial to include “habitual offender” charge).
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California (1850) followed the common law rule on charging prior
convictions, providing for the portion of the information alleging the
prior conviction to be kept from the jury if the defendant admitted or
confessed the prior conviction. See State v. O'Neill, 248 P. 215, 217
(Mont. 1926) (discussing California precedent); People v. Meyer, 15 P.
95, 96 (Cal. 1887) (noting that it is error to inform the jury of a previous
conviction when the defendant had already confessed to it). It continues
to do so, although it switched to bifurcated trials in 1981. See People v.
Saunders, 853 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Cal. 1993) (noting decision adopting
bifurcation in 1981 and subsequent codification of that requirement);
People v. Coleman, 79 P. 283 (Cal. 1904) (holding prior offense properly
charged and tried with other elements); People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113,
115 (1873).
Colorado (1876) continues to follow the common law rule on charging.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-801 (West 2013) (“Such former
conviction or convictions and judgment or judgments shall be set forth
in apt words in the indictment or information.”); Lakomy v. People, 178
P. 571, 572 (Colo. 1919) (finding the information properly charged the
former conviction, which was an issue before the jury). A 1929 statute
authorized the supplemental charging process, but, reasoning that “[i]f
the former conviction be not charged, but may be established by
evidence, [the] defendant would plead at his peril and might be
confronted with a penalty undreamed of,” the state’s high court held
that “[i]f, before trial, the district attorney knows of such, and has any
discretion in the matter, he must charge or waive.” Smalley v. People,
43 P.2d 385, 385–86 (Colo. 1935); see also People v. Rieger, 128 P.3d 295,
296 (Colo. App. 2005) (“[T]he trial court misinterpreted the plain
language of § 18-1.3-803(6) when it allowed the prosecutor to file two
habitual criminal counts against Rieger after he had pled guilty, despite
the prosecutor’s prior knowledge of the convictions. Contrary to the
trial court’s ruling, the statute does not allow a prosecutor, for good
cause or otherwise, to add known habitual criminal counts after a guilty
plea has been accepted.”).
Connecticut (1788) followed the common law rule on charging and still
does. State v. Bjorklund, 830 A.2d 1141, 1159 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003);
State v. Riley, 110 A. 550, 552–53 (Conn. 1920) (collecting authority)
(“[I]f the state intends to make any claim to raise the penalty by reason
of such prior conviction, the defendant should in the information be
apprised of this additional element upon which such claim of the state is
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to be based. It is accordingly a uniform rule that such additional
allegations relating to the penalty alone should be incorporated in the
information. . . . [W]e cannot see why the allegations necessary to
invoke the severer penalty provided by the statute in case of two prior
convictions are not properly and correctly stated in the information
before us.”); State v. Ryan, 37 A. 377, 378 (Conn. 1897) (“[T]he
existence of a first offense is, of course, one of the essential elements of
the charge and must be alleged in some way, or the charge will be fatally
defective . . . .”).
Delaware (1787) A second offense liquor law was enacted in 1915, and it
appears that the prior offense was part of the indictment then. See State
v. Legg, 93 A. 556, 557 (Del. 1915). In 1953, a Superior Court decision
suggested that the supplemental information was the best approach.
State v. Owens, 101 A.2d 319, 320 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953) (stating with
regard to the 1953 habitual offender law that “an acceptable
procedure . . . would consist of something less formal than an indictment
but of more dignity than a mere motion. This would be by way of a
supplemental information immediately following the fourth conviction
for felony. Upon such an information, defendant could be arraigned
and plead guilty or not guilty. In the rare case where a not guilty plea is
entered, the only normal issue of fact for determination would be
whether or not defendant had been convicted four times for felony”
(internal citations omitted)); see also Gibbs v. State, 208 A.2d 306, 308
(Del. 1965) (“The origination and evolution of the procedure, used to
implement our Habitual Criminal Act, appear in State v. Owens, [101
A.2d 319] and in 11 Del.C. § 3912 [providing for a separate information
to be filed anytime before conviction or sentence]. It appears that
§ 3912 was enacted as the result of the Owens case in which the court
noted the lack of a procedure for implementing the Act. The court
there prescribed the proceeding by information as a means of utilizing
the Act with due regard for the demands of due process of law.”). The
defendant retained the option of seeking a determination of habitual
offender status beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. See Gibbs, 208
A.2d at 307 n.1 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3912(b)). The statute
provided that prior convictions aggravating the punishment for an
offense other than those under the habitual offender statute were
proven to the judge at sentencing. Gibbs, 208 A.2d at 307 n.1 (citing
§ 3912(a)); Mergenthaler v. State, 239 A.2d 635, 638–39 (Del. 1968).
Today, proof of prior convictions is made at sentencing before a judge,
and notice need not be given before conviction, see Roten v. State, No.
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108, 2010, 2010 WL 3860663, at *2 (Del. Oct. 4, 2010), but the fact of
prior conviction must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, see
Morales v. State, 696 A.2d 390, 395 (Del. 1997).
Florida (1845) followed the common law rule on charging prior
convictions until the passage of a statute in 1927. See Sparkman v. State
Prison Custodian, 18 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. 1944) (“[I]t is generally
necessary to allege in an indictment the fact of a prior conviction, and
during the trial support said allegation by admitting into evidence a
certified copy of the record or by other competent evidence, in order to
subject an accused to the enhanced punishment . . . .”); Cross v. State,
119 So. 380, 385–87 (Fla. 1928) (upholding second proceeding under
second information filed pursuant to 1927 statute, against ex post facto,
double jeopardy, right to jury trial, equal protection, and due process
challenges, relying upon Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912));
Benson v. State, 101 So. 231, 231 (Fla. 1924) (the jury must expressly
determine separately the question of the historical fact of the
defendant’s former conviction as alleged); State ex rel. Lockmiller v.
Mayo, 101 So. 228, 229 (Fla. 1924) (noting a “prior conviction was a
necessary element in the so-called felony” when second offense was a
felony and first offense a misdemeanor); Smith v. State, 78 So. 530, 532
(Fla. 1918) (“The defendant must be charged with having been before
convicted of a like offense if it is intended to charge him with the felony
of selling liquors as a second offense.”); see also Reynolds v. Cochran,
365 U.S. 525, 529 n.6 (1961) (quoting 1957 Florida statute authorizing
proceeding at any time after conviction). For prior convictions boosting
penalties under other statutes other than its repeat offender provision,
Florida courts continued to follow the common law rule. Johnson v.
State, 229 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (“The question that is
before us here is whether in those cases where the statute provides
increased punishment for the commission of successive related offenses,
one may be sentenced as a second or third or subsequent offender
without having been so charged and the allegations proved in an
adversary proceeding conducted with all due process safeguards. This
must be answered in the negative.”).
Georgia (1788) followed the common law rule on charging until a 1974
statute permitted prior convictions the state “made known” to the
defendant before trial to be found by a judge at a hearing after
conviction. See Act of Mar. 20, 1974, no. 854, § 7, 1974 Ga. Laws 352,
357 (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503) (providing

KING FINAL (6-30-14) (W-APP 11) (DO NOT DELETE)

570

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/2/2014 5:15 PM

[97:3

“only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the
defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible”); State v. Hendrixson,
310 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga. 1984) (relying on § 27-2503 and upholding life
sentence based on prior offenses when those prior offenses were not set
out in the indictment); see also Elrod v. Caldwell, 209 S.E.2d 207, 208
(Ga. 1974) (“[T]he appellant was not charged as a recidivist and could
not have been sentenced as a second offender by the trial court.”);
Riggins v. Stynchcombe, 203 S.E.2d 208, 212 (Ga. 1974) (applying a 1969
statute that required a two-stage trial, but holding that “[f]or one to
receive recidivist punishment he must have been indicted under a
recidivist statute, his prior convictions having been considered by the
Grand Jury and having been included in the indictment. In short, one
cannot be indicted by a Grand Jury for only one offense carrying a
maximum punishment, and then have that maximum punishment
increased at the election of the state’s prosecuting officers” (emphasis
added)); Studdard v. State, 169 S.E.2d 327, 328 (Ga. 1969) (“It would be
a travesty of justice to permit an accusation . . . to charge a felony
punishable by imprisonment for one period of time and then to permit
evidence to be introduced which would authorize imprisonment for a
longer period of time.”); Tribble v. State, 148 S.E. 593, 595 (Ga. 1929)
(“The fact of a former conviction and sentence must be charged in the
indictment, where a second conviction would affect the grade of the
offense or require the imposition of a different punishment.”);
McWhorter v. State, 44 S.E. 873, 874 (Ga. 1903) (“Where the second
conviction changes the grade of the offense, or authorizes a higher
penalty than could otherwise have been imposed, the former conviction
enters as an element into the new offense, and must be alleged as a
necessary part of the description and character of the crime intended to
be punished.”); Hines v. State, 26 Ga. 614, 616 (Ga. 1859) (“The
allegation is certainly one of the first importance to the accused, for if it
is true, he becomes subject to a greatly increased punishment.”); Peavy
v. State, 283 S.E.2d 346, 350–51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (holding a separate
allegation and jury determination were not required since the 1974 law
required “the judge in non-death penalty cases where a guilty verdict is
returned to dismiss the jury and conduct a presentence hearing wherein
‘the judge shall hear additional evidence in . . . aggravation of
punishment, including the record of any criminal convictions and pleas
of guilty’” (alteration in original) (quoting § 27-2503)).
Idaho (1890), like California, followed the common law rule on charging
and still does, but adopted a bifurcated trial procedure. State v. Roy,
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899 P.2d 441, 443 (Idaho 1995) (“In State v. Johnson, this Court
announced a procedure to be followed where a criminal defendant is
charged under the persistent violator statute (I.C. § 19–2514). In such a
case the information must be prepared in two parts, the first setting
forth the substantive offense charged, and the second alleging prior
convictions. The trial must also be bifurcated. During the first phase,
the jury should be read only the first part of the information. The trial
should then proceed as if there were no allegations of prior convictions.
Only if the jury returns a guilty verdict on the substantive charge should
the second part of the information be read and the jury allowed to
consider the recidivist charge.” (internal citation omitted) (citing State
v. Johnson, 383 P.2d 326, 331–32 (Idaho 1963), wherein the court
adopted a bifurcated trial but still required the reading of allegations
included in the initial charge, with one part of the information read to
the jury and the other read only upon conviction of the first part)); State
v. Lovejoy, 95 P.2d 132, 134 (Idaho 1939) (“[F]ormer convictions relied
on must be alleged in the indictment or information and proved at the
trial[,] and the identity of the defendant as the person formerly
convicted must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v.
Scheminisky, 174 P. 611, 611–12 (Idaho 1918) (holding when an accused
is charged with being a persistent violator of the law, “the former
conviction[s] must be alleged in the indictment or information and
proved at the trial”).
Illinois (1818) followed the common law rule on charging when it
adopted its repeat larceny statute in 1867 and its habitual offender
statute in 1883. See Act of June 28, 1867, § 1, 1867 Ill. Laws 37, 37–38;
Act of June 23, 1883, § 1, 1883 Ill. Laws 76, 76. It continued to follow
that rule in repeat-offender cases until the habitual offender statute was
amended in the late 1950s. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 603.3(a) (1959)
(described in People v. Williams, 599 N.E.2d 913, 918 (Ill. 1992), as
including a revision that provided in part that “[a] former conviction of a
felony shall not be alleged in the indictment, and no evidence or other
disclosure of such conviction shall be presented to the court or the jury
during the trial of the principal offense”); People v. Robinson, 656
N.E.2d 1090, 1099 (Ill. 1995) (explaining that, prior to the 1978
amendment, the Habitual Criminal Act involved alleging a defendant's
qualifying convictions in the indictment and proving them at trial, but
the amendment changed the Habitual Criminal Act to a sentencing
provision); People v. Hayes, 429 N.E.2d 490, 491 (Ill. 1981) (refusing to
hold that “because the prior conviction elevates the degree of the
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offense from a misdemeanor to a felony it should be necessary, at the
risk of prejudice to the accused, that it be alleged in the information and
proved”); People v. Long, 123 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ill. 1955) (“Unless
controlled by statute, it is generally held that in order to subject an
accused to the enhanced punishment for a second or subsequent
offense, or as an habitual criminal, it is necessary to allege in the
indictment the fact of the prior conviction.”); Featherstone v. People, 62
N.E. 684, 685–87 (Ill. 1901) (requiring the former conviction or
convictions to be “set forth in apt words in the indictment” (citing § 1,
1867 Ill. Laws at 37–38; § 1, 1883 Ill. Laws at 76); People v. Ramey, 317
N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (holding “it is necessary to allege
the previous conviction in the indictment in order to assess the
enhanced penalty”).
Indiana (1816) codified the common law rule on charging and proof
before a jury in a 1907 statute, see Act of Feb. 28, 1907, ch. 82, § 1, 1907
Ind. Acts 109, 109, reenacted in 1926 and thereafter, see Smith v. State,
87 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ind. 1949); Kelley v. State, 185 N.E. 453, 455 (Ind.
1933). Bifurcation was not required, see Sammons v. State, 199 N.E.
555, 558 (Ind. 1936); Barr v. State, 187 N.E. 259, 261 (Ind. 1933), until
1972 when the state’s high court adopted the Connecticut bifurcated
process, see Shelton v. State, 602 N.E.2d 1017, 1019 (Ind. 1992) (“The
habitual offender statute was therefore amended to reflect this
bifurcation requirement. Under the statute, a jury is not presented with
an habitual offender charge until after it has determined the defendant's
guilt or innocence on the underlying felony charge. If the jury finds the
defendant guilty, ‘the jury . . . reconvene[s] for the sentencing hearing’
on the habitual offender count.” (alteration in original) (internal citation
omitted) (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8(c) (West Supp. 1992)));
Lawrence v. State, 286 N.E.2d 830, 835 (Ind. 1972) (“If they return a
verdict of guilty, the second part of the information, in which former
convictions are alleged, should be read to them without reswearing
them, and they should be charged to inquire on that issue. Of course,
the accused may plead guilty to this part of the information, and then no
further proceedings before or by the jury would be necessary. No
reason appears why the accused, if he should choose, might not submit
this issue to the court without the jury.” (quoting State v. Ferrone, 113 A.
452, 457–58 (Conn. 1921)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
bifurcated procedure was thereafter extended to other statutes
aggravating the penalty for a crime committed by a prior offender, see,
e.g., Minor v. State, 792 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), but not for
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felon-in-possession cases, see Spearman v. State, 744 N.E.2d 545, 548
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting bifurcation for felon in possession cases
because “[i]t is not practical, or even possible, to bifurcate the
proceedings in this case”). The statute requiring allegations and proof
before the jury is still in effect. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8(a) (West
2012). The state courts in 1975 found no constitutional barrier to filing
the habitual allegation after conviction, relying on Oyler v. Boyles, 368
U.S. 448 (1962), although the practice appears to be to file these
allegations at the same time as the substantive offense. Lewis v. State,
337 N.E.2d 516, 520–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (“[W]e cannot perceive any
substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights by permitting the
proceedings to determine the applicability of the sentence for recidivists
to be initiated after completion of the trial on the substantive offense.”);
see also Cheney v. State, 486 N.E.2d 508, 514 (Ind. 1985) (“In the case at
bar the amendment was filed on September 13, 1983, and trial
commenced on October 31, 1983. We find this time period was
sufficient to permit appellant to adequately prepare his defense.”); Funk
v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1081, 1087–88 (Ind. 1981) (noting that in cases
where habitual allegations were added after arraignment but before
trial, “The right of the State to amend by adding an habitual offender
count has specifically been approved by this Court. An information
may be amended at any time before, during, or after trial so long as it
does not prejudice the rights of the defendant.” (internal citation
omitted) (quoting Gilmore v. State, 415 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ind. 1981))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Iowa (1846) followed the common law rule on charging and still does,
but bifurcated its jury trials in 1966. See State v. Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d
687, 691 (Iowa 2005) (recounting history of two-stage trial requirement);
State v. Robinson, 165 N.W.2d 802, 803–04 (Iowa 1969) (noting history
of 1966 statute); State v. Smith, 106 N.W. 187, 189 (Iowa 1906) (“[T]he
statute requires that the fact of former convictions shall be set forth in
the indictment. And this but conforms to the general rule governing
criminal procedure. . . . The plea of not guilty puts in issue, not only all
matters of fact essential to the instant crime, but the fact of the alleged
former convictions of the defendant. Moreover, as we have seen, the
statute requires a special finding at the hands of the jury as to the fact of
such former convictions.” (citations omitted)). Iowa law presently
requires the prior conviction to be charged. IOWA CODE ANN. RULE
2.6(5) (West 2002 & Supp. 2013) ( “If the offense charged is one for
which the defendant, if convicted, will be subject by reason of the Code
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to an increased penalty because of prior convictions, the allegation of
such convictions, if any, shall be contained in the indictment. A
supplemental indictment shall be prepared for the purpose of trial of the
facts of the current offense only, and shall satisfy all pertinent
requirements of the Code, except that it shall make no mention, directly
or indirectly, of the allegation of the prior convictions, and shall be the
only indictment read or otherwise presented to the jury prior to
conviction of the current offense. The effect of this subrule shall be to
alter the procedure for trying, in one criminal proceeding, the offenses
appropriate to its provisions, and not to alter in any manner the basic
elements of an offense as provided by law.”).
Kansas (1861) codified a penalty for former offenders before statehood,
see State v. Lohrbach, 538 P.2d 678, 681 (Kan. 1975) (citing Act of Feb.
3, 1859, ch. 28, § 278, 1859 Kan. Sess. Laws 231, 283 (codified at GEN.
STAT. KAN. ch. 31, § 289 (1868)), but it did not follow the common law
rule. Instead, it permitted notice of the enhanced penalty to be given
after conviction. Wasson v. State, 499 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Kan. 1972)
(“[T]he seven-day notice given to the appellant, after his entry of a plea
of guilty, was sufficient to authorize the state to proceed under the
habitual criminal act.”); Chance v. State, 408 P.2d 677, 681 (Kan. 1965)
(“It has never been the rule in Kansas that a defendant in a criminal
action must be apprised by the State prior to conviction that the State
intends to invoke the habitual criminal act.”). Kansas statutes also
allowed the judge to determine the prior conviction that would raise the
penalty range. State v. Woodman, 272 P. 132, 134 (Kan. 1928).
Interestingly, the state did follow the common law rule for a different
repeat-offender statute. A defendant’s former conviction was included
in the charge and proven to the jury under a persistent violator liquor
statute passed in 1911. See State v. King, 141 P. 247, 248 (Kan. 1914)
(terming “former conviction of a violation of the prohibitory law” the
other element of the charge to be included in the information). For the
high court’s explanation of the different treatment, see Levell v.
Simpson, 52 P.2d 372, 374 (Kan. 1935) (“The circumspection which our
procedure exerts to keep the fact of any former convictions for felonies
away from the jury is to protect the accused from the possibility that in
his pending trial the jury might conceive a prejudice against him as an
habitual criminal. But where a second offense is a separate and distinct
crime, it must necessarily be so charged in the information, and the
proof to support the charge in all its details would have to be submitted
to the jury. We have one such crime in this state; the persistent violation

KING FINAL (6-30-14) (W-APP 11) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

SENTENCING AND PRIOR CONVICTIONS

7/2/2014 5:15 PM

575

of the prohibitory law. A first offense against the prohibitory law (with
exceptions not here pertinent) is a misdemeanor punishable by a
moderate fine and jail sentence. R.S. 21-2101. But a subsequent
infraction of the prohibitory law is quite a different and a more serious
crime. It is a distinct felony. R.S. 21–2146. In such a case, all the
formalities of a felonious charge should be pleaded in the information.
Of necessity, too, every material allegation in such an information would
have to be proved to the satisfaction of a jury.” (internal citations
omitted)).
Kentucky (1792) (a jury sentencing state) followed the common law rule
on charging when it adopted its habitual offender statute in 1881 and
continues to do so today. See Price v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 749,
750 (Ky. 1984) (“We interpret the PFO[, Persistent Felony Offender,]
statute as requiring that if the Commonwealth seeks enhancement by
proof of PFO status, the defendant is entitled to notice of this before the
trial of the underlying substantive offense. A separate indictment meets
this requirement just as does a separate count in the indictment charging
the substantive offense to which it refers.”); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 3
Ky. L. Rptr. 783 (1882); Carter v. Commonwealth, 11 Ky. Op. 92, 93
(1881) (“A former conviction must be specifically pleaded, whether
presented as a defense to an indictment or inserted in that pleading by
the prosecutor with a view of increasing the punishment. The fact that
the accused had been previously indicted for a felony, describing the
nature of the offense, in a court having jurisdiction, that he was assigned
and pled to the indictment, and was found guilty and sentenced, etc., are
facts necessary to be alleged. The prisoner must know from the
statements contained in the indictment the former convictions relied
on.”); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 11 Ky. Op. 138, 138 (1881); Clark v.
Commonwealth, 324 S.W.3d 747, 749–50 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (agreeing
with a Texas Court rejecting Oyler as constitutional floor, the court
found “that basic due process requires that the defendant be informed
of the nature of the charges he is accused and the consequences of a
conviction before jeopardy attaches so that he is aware of the potential
consequences of a conviction and to prepare a possible defense. . . . [I]t
is contrary to the basic notion of due process to return a PFO indictment
during the trial on the underlying offense” (internal citation omitted)).
Louisiana (1812) passed a repeat offender provision in 1870, and in 1880
the Supreme Court appeared to approve of omitting the prior conviction
from the charge, State v. Hudson, 32 La. Ann. 1052, 1053 (1880), but this
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approach was overruled in State v. Compagno, 51 So. 681, 682 (La. 1910)
(“[T]he first conviction . . . is an aggravation which gives rise to an
increase of the punishment. . . . [I]t becomes a part of the second
offense. It is the basis of the sentence for increasing the punishment.”).
After Graham, a new statute in 1928 permitting postsentence allegations
and proof before a judge was upheld as constitutional (over the dissent
of one justice). See State v. Guidry, 124 So. 832, 835 (La. 1929) (“There
is no provision in the Constitution that we have been able to find which
authorizes or requires questions of fact not pertaining to the guilt or
innocence of a defendant to be submitted to a jury. The act itself does
not expressly require, nor does the language by fair implication
authorize, the submission to a jury of the fact as to whether the
defendant was a second offender.”). By the 1970s, a state statute
permitted prior offender charges to be filed after initial sentencing,
while the defendant was incarcerated. State v. Bullock, 329 So. 2d 733,
736 (La. 1976) (relating history). The courts later clarified that the
common law rule on charging and proof for prior convictions was
limited to statutes that enhanced a penalty for a specific type of crime.
See State v. Skipper, 906 So. 2d 399, 416–17 (La. 2005) (holding that
“La. R.S. 40:982 should be treated as a sentencing enhancement
provision after conviction, like La. R.S. 15:529.1, and not as a
substantive element of the presently-charged offense”). Under the
Louisiana statute providing that the judge may sentence any person
convicted for a second or subsequent offense to a double or triple
penalty, or to perpetual imprisonment for the fourth offense, it is held
that the proof of the former convictions must be heard and passed on by
the jury, since “the jury alone has authority to subject an accused party
to the double or greater penalty . . . for the subsequent conviction.”
State v. Bailey, 115 So. 613, 616 (La. 1927).
Maine (1820), in enforcing its habitual offender law, first departed from
the common law rule during the period from 1824 to 1897, see Jenness v.
State, 64 A.2d 184, 185 (Me. 1949) (noting that section 18 of chapter 282
of the Public Laws of Maine (1824) “provided that the habitual offender
when ‘convicted’ of a felony might be sentenced for a limited term or for
life” and that section 19, repealed in 1897, had provided that, “if the
prior sentence was not known at the time of indictment and conviction,
the warden and prison inspectors had authority to obtain legal process
to have the convict tried on the fact of prior conviction”); followed it
from 1897 through 1961, see State v. McClay, 78 A.2d 347, 352–54 (Me.
1951) (finding charge was required by the state constitution); again
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permitted prior offense charges to be filed after conviction but before
sentencing from 1961 to 1999, mandating that they be included in an
“ancillary” indictment and proven in a separate jury phase after the jury
convicted of the underlying offense until 1989, see State v. Heald, 382
A.2d 290, 298 (Me. 1978) (discussing dual indictment process); State v.
Melvin, 341 A.2d 376, 380 (Me. 1975) (“[T]he Legislature provided [in
1961] that when the existence of a prior conviction enhances the penalty
which may be imposed on a current offense, allegation of the prior
offense must be separate from, and its determination must be
subsequent to, that of the current offense.” (citation omitted)); then
made this later pleading optional from 1989 to 1999, see State v. Brooks,
656 A.2d 1205, 1207 (Me. 1995) (“Failure to allege the previous
conviction precludes the court from imposing the mandatory minimum
penalty . . . .”); Landry v. State, 575 A.2d 315, 316–17 (Me. 1990)
(quoting statute as amended in 1989); and finally returned to requiring
such allegations up front, continuing to follow the common law rule
today, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17–A, § 9–A (West 2006) (“[A] prior
conviction must be specially alleged if the sentencing provision of a
crime requires that a present sentence be enhanced because the person
has been previously convicted of a specified crime.”); ME. R. CRIM. P. 7
(“If a prior conviction must be specially alleged pursuant to 17–A
M.R.S.A. § 9–A(1) it may not be alleged in an ancillary indictment,
information or separate count thereof but instead must be part of the
allegations constituting the principal crime. . . . Unless the statutory
class for the principal crime would be elevated thereby, amendment of
an indictment or information for purposes of 17–A M.R.S.A. § 9–A(1)
may be made as of right by the attorney for the state at any time prior to
the imposition of sentence on the principal crime and sentencing shall
be continued until the attorney for the state has been afforded the
opportunity to obtain an amended indictment if the allegation must be
made by the grand jury.”).
When enforcing other repeat offender provisions, Maine has
followed the common law rule since at least 1855. State v. Regan, 63
Me. 127, 128 (1873) (stating in liquor law case that “[f]ormer convictions
are alleged, with a view, undoubtedly, to increased punishment”); State
v. Robinson, 39 Me. 150, 155 (1855) (discussing the “common thief”
statute); see also State v. McClay, 78 A.2d 347, 352 (Me. 1951) (“This
section, R.S. 1944, Chap. 57, Sec. 72, and its predecessors are not the
source of the rule of criminal pleading which requires that prior
convictions be alleged in order that enhanced penalties may or must be
imposed upon second or subsequent offenders under statutes providing
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therefor. That rule has its source in the common law. It is preserved by
Art. I, Sec. 6 of our Constitution, supra, as a sacred right of, and a
protection to, those accused of crime.”). Bifurcated trials have been
permitted in Maine for more than fifty years. State v. Mottram, 184
A.2d 225, 226 (Me. 1962) (“At his request he was given a separate jury
trial on each count. The jury hearing the larceny count was not
informed of the ‘habitual offender’ or second count.”); see also State v.
Sapiel, 432 A.2d 1262, 1271 (Me. 1981) (“Although 15 M.R.S.A. § 757
requires separate trials for the principal offense and the ancillary
proceeding, we conclude that the use of the same jury for both trials did
not deprive the Defendant of his right to a fair trial.”).
Maryland (1788) followed the common law rule on charging until 1962.
See Swann v. State, 1 A. 872, 872 (Md. 1885); Maguire v. State, 47 Md.
485, 496 (1878) (holding in a case of conviction for second offense
transactions in liquor on the Sabbath, common law required that “if the
party be proceeded against for a second or third offense under the
statute, and the sentence prescribed be different from the first, or
severer, by reason of its being such second or third offense, the fact thus
relied on must be averred in the indictment; for the settled rule is, that
the indictment must contain an averment of every fact essential to
justify the punishment inflicted”); see also Hall v. State, 89 A. 111, 112
(Md. 1913) (indicating that jury must find specially as to the fact of a
prior conviction); Goeller v. State, 85 A. 954, 955 (Md. 1912) (striking
down second offense statute that provided aggravated penalty after
judge, not jury, found prior conviction and holding that the prior
conviction should have been alleged in indictment and proven to jury
under state constitution). When it adopted second offense drug laws in
1951, this practice of pleading and proving prior conviction allegations
continued. Beard v. State, 140 A.2d 672, 676, 682 (Md. 1958) (rejecting
a constitutional requirement that the jury must pass on the accused’s
alleged prior convictions at the same time that it passes upon the alleged
current offense, the court noted that “in the absence of a binding
admission by the accused of one or more prior convictions, they should
call for special verdicts or findings as to the historical facts of any prior
convictions which may be alleged”); Robertson v. Warden, Md. House
of Corr., 129 A.2d 90, 91 (Md. 1957). In 1962, new court Rule 713
barred the inclusion of the prior conviction in the indictment, and
instead required the state to attach to the indictment notice of the state’s
intent to prosecute the defendant as a subsequent offender and notice of
the defendant’s option to have the fact of his prior conviction tried
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“concurrently with the trial for the current offense or be determined by
the court or jury after the verdict on the current offense.” MD. R. PROC.
713(b) (1962) (repealed 1977) (emphasis added) (discussed in Sullivan v.
State, 349 A.2d 663, 665 (Md. 1976)). In 1977, the state judiciary, noting
Oyler and Graham, adopted a new Rule 734 that was modeled on the
court rule in place in the District of Columbia. The new rule abandoned
the procedure of Rule 713 and required that, prior to a guilty plea or
trial, the state’s attorney serve a notice on the defendant or his or her
counsel that the state will seek increased punishment as well as set forth
each prior conviction to be relied upon. In 1984, a failure to provide
notice before trial of the specific convictions that would be alleged to
aggravate the penalty was held to be harmless error. King v. State, 477
A.2d 768, 776 (Md. 1984); see also Lee v. State, 632 A.2d 1183, 1189–91
(Md. 1993) (holding that notice mailed to the defendant and received a
reasonable time prior to sentencing meets notice requirement of
Maryland Rule 4–245(b) and satisfies due process). Prior conviction
allegations in Maryland must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt but
need not be proven to a jury. See Dove v. State, 4 A.3d 976, 987 (Md.
2010) (“[T]he State must prove each element of the enhanced penalty
statute beyond a reasonable doubt, including the defendant’s identity in
the previous qualifying convictions.”); Testerman v. State, 907 A.2d 294,
301 (Md. 2006) (finding that there was no need for “a collateral factfinding proceeding” because the “critical facts are not in dispute”
(quoting In re Parris W., 770 A.2d 202, 207 (2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Massachusetts (1788) first created the optional supplemental
information process in 1817, then returned to the common law rule later
in the nineteenth century. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying
text; McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312 (1901) (noting that
the prior convictions were charged in the indictment under
Massachusetts’s habitual offender statute); Commonwealth v.
Richardson, 55 N.E. 988, 988 (Mass. 1900) (noting that the previous
convictions were alleged in the indictment); Tuttle v. Commonwealth,
68 Mass. (2 Gray) 505, 506 (1854) (holding that a prior conviction
increasing maximum sentence must be set forth in indictment); Plumbly
v. Commonwealth, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 413, 413–15 (1841);
Commonwealth v. Phillips, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 28, 34 (1831) (“This
proceeding by information to award additional punishment where
sentence has already been pronounced, is founded solely on statute, is
not known at the common law, is in a high degree penal, and therefore is
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not to be extended by construction beyond the cases clearly
contemplated by the statute.”); In re Ross, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 165, 170
(1824). In 1880, the state’s high court found that the state’s liquor law,
which made it unnecessary to allege previous convictions in the
complaint, was contrary to the state’s constitution. Commonwealth v.
Harrington, 130 Mass. 35, 36 (1880) (citing the state constitution and
stating that “[i]t follows that the offence which is punishable with the
higher penalty is not fully and substantially described to the defendant,
if the complaint fails to set forth the former convictions which are
essential features of it”); see also Commonwealth v. Briggs, 24 Mass. (7
Pick.) 177, 179–80 (1828) (setting aside defendant’s verdict when
prosecution failed to provide “proof of identity” of the defendant’s prior
conviction); Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738, 754 (1852)
(relying on Briggs and finding failure to allege barred later penalty).
Today, “prior convictions are no longer treated as elements,” but that
“is irrelevant to the requirement under art. 12” of the state constitution.
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 834 N.E.2d 240, 247 (Mass. 2005) (“If a
defendant is made susceptible to a prescribed statutorily enhanced
penalty because of a former conviction, the predicate offense must be
alleged in the complaint or indictment.”). The state constitution
requires that “prior convictions must be alleged in the complaint or
indictment and proved” to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 247,
251; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 25 (West 1998 & Supp.
2013) (habitual offender law).
Michigan (1837) followed the common law rule through the 1920s.
People v. McDonald, 206 N.W. 516, 517 (Mich. 1925); People v. Roth,
200 N.W. 136, 136–37 (Mich. 1924); People v. Campbell, 139 N.W. 24,
25–26 (Mich. 1912); People v. Butler, 80 N.W. 883, 883–84 (Mich. 1899);
People v. Buck, 67 N.W. 982, 982 (Mich. 1896); People v. Ellsworth, 36
N.W. 236, 238–39 (Mich. 1888). In 1929, the legislature authorized postconviction supplemental informations to be filed. See People v. Eason,
458 N.W.2d 17, 25–26 (Mich. 1990) (relating history); People v. Cairns,
145 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Mich. 1966) (authorizing prosecutor to file
supplemental information accusing defendant of prior convictions if “at
any time after conviction and either before or after sentence it shall
appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been
convicted” (quoting 3 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 17341 (1929)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). For part of this period, this supplemental
information could not be filed after conviction if the prosecutor knew
about the prior conviction before then. The state legislature amended
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the habitual offender statutes in 1994, making the issue of defendant’s
status as prior offender no longer a jury question and allowing notice
(not an information) to be filed within twenty-one days of arraignment
with no exceptions for late discovered priors after conviction. See
People v. Morales, 618 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (tracing
history); People v. Weatherholt, 543 N.W.2d 34, 35 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.13 (West Supp. 2013)
(“In a criminal action, the prosecuting attorney may seek to enhance the
sentence of the defendant as provided under section 10, 11, or 12 of this
chapter, by filing a written notice of his or her intent to do so within 21
days after the defendant’s arraignment on the information charging the
underlying offense or, if arraignment is waived, within 21 days after the
filing of the information charging the underlying offense.” (footnote
omitted) (citing §§ 769.10–769.12)); MICH. R. CRIM. P. 6.112 (F).
Minnesota (1858) followed the common law rule on charging for its
repeat offender provision, which passed in 1905. MINN. STAT. § 4772
(1905); see also State ex rel. Carmody v. Reed, 156 N.W. 127, 127 (Minn.
1916) (“It is settled in this state in accordance with the great weight of
authority that in order to warrant the imposition of the increased
punishment upon second offenders the prior conviction must be charged
in the indictment and also established on the trial, if there be a trial, and
a verdict of the jury rendered thereon.”); State v. Findling, 144 N.W.
142, 143–44 (Minn. 1913) (“We follow and apply the general rule,
though it may be remarked, in passing, that entire fairness in
prosecutions of this character would suggest some statutory change in
the law, dispensing with the necessity of pleading the fact of prior
conviction, and providing for the determination thereof by the court
after conviction of the charge on trial.”). Newer statutes authorizing
enhanced penalties for prior conviction without pleading and proof
before a jury have been upheld. See, e.g., State v. Ronquist, 600 N.W.2d
444, 450 (Minn. 1999) (noting that “provisions of section 609.346, subd.
2a(a)(2)(iii) (1996), fall into the category of sentencing considerations
and do not constitute elements of the crime to be proven at trial”).
Following Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), state law
provided for jury findings of facts that triggered aggravated sentences,
but state courts have maintained that allegations of such facts in the
indictment is not required. E.g., State v. Rodriguez, No. KX-04-319,
2006 WL 6343278, at *A-3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2008) (noting that
although not required by the Minnesota Constitution, “the prosecution
did set forth the aggravating departure factors that it intended to rely
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upon in the amended complaint in this case prior to the time the
defendant entered his guilty pleas. Accordingly, the defendant had
constitutionally adequate notice of the aggravating factors that the
prosecution intended to rely upon in this case before he entered his
guilty pleas”).
Mississippi (1817) followed the common law rule on charging until the
1990s. See, e.g., Hentz v. State, 542 So. 2d 914, 918 (Miss. 1989) (“The
indictment against an habitual offender must include a charge of
habitual offender status sufficient to satisfy notice/due process
requirements . . . .”); Burnett v. State, 285 So. 2d 783, 785 (Miss. 1973);
Ainsworth v. State, 40 So. 2d 298, 301 (Miss. 1949); Millwood v. State, 1
So. 2d 582, 583 (Miss. 1941); Brewsaw v. State, 151 So. 475, 476 (Miss.
1933); Hoggett v. State, 57 So. 812, 813 (Miss. 1912) (“Where a greater
punishment may be inflicted for a second or subsequent violation of a
penal law than for the first, the fact that the offense is a second or
subsequent violation must be directly averred in the information or
indictment, to justify the increased punishment; else it will not be
considered as an offense for which the increased punishment can be
inflicted, but will be deemed to be the first offense.” (quoting 10 THE
ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE 489 (William M.
McKinnery ed., 1898)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Norton v.
State, 3 So. 665, 666 (Miss. 1888) (“The judgment of the court below was
also erroneous for the reason that it imposed upon appellant the penalty
prescribed for the second offense under the local option act, when there
was no allegation in the indictment as to its being such offense.”). A
1995 ruling upheld an amendment to add a habitual offender notice on
the eve of trial on the basis that it concerned only sentencing. Burrell v.
State, 727 So. 2d 761, 766 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998).
Missouri (1821) has followed the common law rule on charging prior
convictions under its repeat offender law since it was first enacted in
1835. See Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676–77 (1895) (discussing
Missouri case law upholding its habitual offender provision); State v.
Nolan, 316 S.W.2d 630, 633–34 (Mo. 1958) (discussing the
constitutionality of the Habitual Criminal Act); State v. Krebs, 80
S.W.2d 196, 198 (Mo. 1935) (discussing history); State v. Moore, 26 S.W.
345, 346–47 (Mo. 1894) (“[S]everal previous convictions may be lawfully
set out in the indictment when the object in setting them out is only to
justify a severer punishment.”); State v. Austin, 21 S.W. 31, 32 (1893)
(“[I]t needs no citations or argument to prove that the indictment under
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it must allege all the material facts which constitute the offense, so as to
bring the defendant within the provisions of the statute. . . . [I]t is a
material and essential averment that the felony charged was committed
after a former conviction for an offense punishable by imprisonment in
the penitentiary . . . . There is no hardship in requiring the state to
inform a man of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
before requiring him to defend his life or liberty.”); State v. Lehr, 16
Mo. App. 491, 491 (1885). Present law requires prior offenses to be
included in the “indictment or information, original or amended, or in
the information in lieu of indictment,” State v. Johnson, 150 S.W.3d 132,
136 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004), but since 1959, the statute has authorized a
judge, not the jury, to determine whether the government has proven
those prior convictions, see State v. Morton, 338 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo.
1960); see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.016 (West 2012); State v. Taborn,
412 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (striking down sentence when
state failed to plead and prove defendant to be a persistent offender).
Montana (1889) followed the common law rule until 1967, when a
statute required “notice” of the prior conviction allegation to be
provided to the accused before plea or trial and that the prior conviction
allegation be tried to the court, not the jury, after conviction. See State
v. Cooper, 489 P.2d 99, 101–02 (Mont. 1971) (discussing Act of Feb. 28,
1967, ch. 196, § 1, 1967 Mont. Laws 353, 400 (codified as amended at
REV. CODE. MONT. § 95-1506); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-108 (West
2013) (same process today). Compare State v. Nelson, 304 P.2d 1110,
1113-15 (Mont. 1956), with State v. O'Neill, 248 P. 215, 217 (Mont.
1926), and State v. Gordon, 90 P. 173, 177 (Mont. 1907), and State v.
Howard, 77 P. 50, 51 (Mont. 1904).
Nebraska (1867) followed the common law rule on charging for its
repeat offender provision passed in 1929, and it still does. Wiese v.
State, 294 N.W. 482, 484 (Neb. 1940); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (2008);
see also Wozniak v. State, 174 N.W. 298, 299 (Neb. 1919) (same, liquor
law passed 1917); Osborne v. State, 211 N.W. 179, 183 (Neb. 1926)
(liquor law). In 1947, a state statute continued to require that the prior
offenses be included in the indictment or information but shifted
determination of that status to the judge. See Haffke v. State, 30
N.W.2d 462, 469 (Neb. 1948) (“[T]he above statute by its terms applies
only to the Habitual Criminal Act, yet it announces rules of practice and
procedure that, as a matter of sound public policy, should apply to any
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statute which imposes the duty upon a court to inflict a greater
punishment upon the repetition of an offense.”).
Nevada (1864) followed the common law rule on charging requiring
inclusion in the indictment, but a 1929 Act authorized the judge to
determine the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. See Howard v.
State, 422 P.2d 548, 549 (Nev. 1967) (noting that a 1967 statute required
inclusion in the charge but barred the jury from learning about the
allegation during trial of the underlying offense, providing that if
contested, the allegation would be determined by a judge beyond a
reasonable doubt after conviction of the underlying offense); State v.
Bardmess, 7 P.2d 817, 818 (Nev. 1932) (“[I]t is proper that he should be
informed of the fact that his former convictions will be invoked that his
punishment may be increased . . . .”). For some time habitual charges
could be brought after conviction, but a 2013 statute now requires them,
absent a showing of good cause, to be filed before trial. See Act of June
1, 2013, ch. 292, § 1, 2013 Nev. Stat. 1373, 1373 (to be codified at NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.016(2)) (“Procedure; trial of primary offense;
prior convictions”); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.485(4)
(LexisNexis 2012) (providing, for third offense (felony) domestic
violence: “The facts concerning a prior offense must be alleged in the
complaint, indictment or information, must not be read to the jury or
proved at trial but must be proved at the time of sentencing and, if the
principal offense is alleged to be a felony, must also be shown at the
preliminary examination or presented to the grand jury” (emphasis
added)); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484C.400(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (same
for third offense (felony) driving under the influence).
New Hampshire (1788) followed the common law rule on charging prior
convictions until a 2002 case, citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224 (1998), overruled prior precedent. See State v. LeBaron,
808 A.2d 541, 543–45 (N.H. 2002), overruling State v. Lantaigne, 371
A.2d 1170, 1171 (N.H. 1977) (prior conviction must be alleged in
charge); Cedergren v. Clarke, 112 A.2d 882, 883 (N.H. 1955); State v.
Adams, 13 A. 785, 785 (N.H. 1888) (“It is true, the heavier sentence for
a subsequent offense cannot be imposed in the absence of an allegation
and proof of a prior conviction.”); see also State v. Stickney, 808 A.2d
546, 548 (N.H. 2002) (relying on LeBaron to find jury need not
determine prior offense status); State v. McLellan, 767 A.2d 953, 957–58
(N.H. 2001) (“[A] prior conviction need not be alleged in the
indictment, . . . [but] the Due Process Clause of the New Hampshire
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Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of prior
convictions used to enhance a defendant's sentence to life without
parole under the provisions of RSA 632-A:10-a, III.”); State v. Small, 14
A. 727, 727 (N.H. 1888) (finding indictment deficient for second
offense).
New Jersey (1787) followed the common law rule on charging initially.
See Weeks v. State, 127 A. 345, 345 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1925) (“Where there is
a different and greater punishment for a second offense, the settled law
seems to be that an offense is considered a first offense, unless a former
offense of the same kind is alleged in the indictment and proved on the
trial.”). In 1931, a statute authorized dispensing with the prior offense
allegation in specific cases and was soon upheld by the state courts as
constitutional. See State v. Burns, 57 A.2d 1, 2 (N.J. 1948); State v.
Mowel, 184 A. 620, 620–21 (N.J. 1936); State v. Myers, 55 A.2d 661, 663
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1947); State v. Rowe, 181 A. 706, 709–10 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1935) (citing Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912)). A
supplemental accusation or information alleging the prior conviction
was required prior to sentencing, however. See State v. Laird, 135 A.2d
859, 867 (N.J. 1957) (noting that “N.J.S. 2A:85–13 provides that if ‘at
anytime, before sentence,’ a prior conviction is made to appear, the
county prosecutor shall file an accusation charging the previous
conviction, and there shall then be a hearing on notice to determine the
fact”); State v. Johnson, 262 A.2d 238, 244 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1970); State v. Booker, 212 A.2d 849, 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1965). Although a 1947 case seemed to suggest that statutory delegation
of the adjudication of prior conviction allegations to the judge was
constitutional, State v. Lutz, 52 A.2d 773, 774 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1947) (“The
usual practice is to allege the prior convictions in the indictment, and to
submit the factual issue thereby arising to the jury; and this course is
obligatory save where the statute makes other adequate provision for
the inquiry, which is not the case here.”), by 1950 it was held that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury was required, even if the
allegation is filed separately, see State v. Janiec, 74 A.2d 605, 607 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950) (“It is the well settled rule that before the
imposition of such a sentence, the defendant must be tried and
convicted by a jury under an indictment specifically charging the prior
convictions, or that a separate proceeding thereafter be undertaken
before a competent court and jury to determine the liability of
defendant to punishment as an habitual criminal and that, to meet the
issue, the defendant has the same rights to a speedy trial, a time for
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preparation, assistance of counsel, compulsory process for witnesses, to
be confronted with the witnesses against him, to require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and to all other rights enjoyed by a defendant on trial
for a criminal offense. To impose a sentence of life imprisonment as an
habitual criminal without conforming to the procedure mentioned,
would be a clear violation of defendant's guaranties of due process
under the Federal and State Constitutions. The refusal of the defendant
at the hearing on the Information to either admit or deny his prior
convictions was equivalent to a plea of not guilty and clearly imposed
upon the State the duty to proceed to have the issue tried and
determined before the court and a jury.” (internal citations omitted)).
In 1953, a statute provided for an independent judicial “hearing on the
issue of habitual criminality.” See Worbetz v. Goodman, 136 A.2d 1, 9
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (“[T]he previous conviction upon
which the increased sentence will rest may be alleged in the main
indictment and established at trial, and an independent proceeding to
adjudicate defendant to be an habitual criminal is unnecessary. A plea
of guilty or admission of the prior convictions at trial waives the need
for formal proof by the State.”). Today, the persistent offender statute
requires only proof before a judge with adequate written notice. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1 (West 2005); State v. Franklin, 871 A.2d
692, 699 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
New York (1788) followed the common law rule on charging initially.
E.g., People ex rel. Cosgriff v. Craig, 88 N.E. 38, 39 (N.Y. 1909); Johnson
v. State, 55 N.Y. 512, 514 (N.Y. 1874) (stating “this has been the uniform
practice in this State” regarding second offense grand larceny (emphasis
added)); People v. Powers, 6 N.Y. 50, 51 (N.Y. 1851); People v. Youngs,
1 Cai. 37, 39–40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803). This changed in 1926 when a new
statute provided that the district attorney could file an information
accusing the prisoner of the previous conviction after conviction or
sentence on the underlying offense, and that allegation carried the right
to jury trial. Act of Apr. 16, 1926, ch. 457, § 3, 1926 N.Y. Laws 805, 805
(codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1943); People v. Gowasky,
155 N.E. 737, 739 (N.Y. 1927); People v. Simmons, 226 N.Y.S. 397, 404
(N.Y. Kings Cnty. Ct. 1927) (“That the adoption of the latter procedure
in this state was motivated by the same consideration that caused the
enactment of the Massachusetts and West Virginia statutes is shown by
the report of the Joint Legislative Committee on the co-ordination of
civil and criminal practice acts (Baumes Committee Report) [N. Y.
Legis. Doc. 1926, vol. 17, No. 84], page 22) . . . .” (alteration in original));
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see also People v. Reese, 179 N.E. 305, 306 (N.Y. 1932); Howard
McLellan, The Baumes Laws, in 6 THE REFERENCE SHELF, THE
BAUMES LAW 48, 52–54 (Julia E. Johnson ed., 1929) (describing change
in the law requiring wardens to “inform courts of newly discovered
records of old offenders which may have escaped the other authorities”
and life sentences imposed on six prisoners after their arrival at the
prison revealed prior convictions). Current law requires written notice
of the allegation of prior conviction status before sentencing and an
opportunity to insist the prior convictions be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to a judge. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 400.15 (second
violent felony offender), 400.16 (persistent violent felony offender),
400.19 (second child sexual assault felony offender), 400.20 (persistent
felony offender), 400.21 (second felony offender or second felony drug
offender) (Consol. 2012).
North Carolina (1789) followed the common law rule on charging from
its beginning through most of the twentieth century, requiring the
allegations in the initial indictment and proof to a jury. State v. Miller,
75 S.E.2d 242, 243 (N.C. 1953) (“Where a statute prescribes a higher
penalty in case of repeated convictions for similar offenses, an
indictment for a subsequent offense must allege facts showing that the
offense charged is a second or subsequent crime within the
contemplation of the statute in order to subject the accused to the
higher penalty.”); State v. Fowler, 136 S.E. 709, 710 (N.C. 1927)
(“[A]ggravated punishment prescribed for a subsequent conviction
cannot be imposed, unless the prior conviction, which is an essential part
of the description of the second offense, is charged in the indictment.”);
State v. Davidson, 32 S.E. 957, 958 (N.C. 1899) (“[N]o previous
conviction for larceny being alleged in the bill, it was erroneous to pass
sentence of imprisonment for more than one year.”); State v. Allen, 10
N.C. (3 Hawks) 614, 616 (N.C. 1825); State v. Daniel, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks)
617, 617 (N.C. 1825); State v. Negro Adam, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 188, 190
(N.C. 1824); State v. Woodson, 272 S.E.2d 167, 168 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)
(“[U]pon a proper charge of a second violation of G.S. 20-138,
allegation and proof of the first conviction is necessary where, as here, it
is not judicially admitted by the defendant.”); State v. Williams, 203
S.E.2d 399, 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (“Neither of the warrants in the
case at bar alleged that the offense charged was a fourth or subsequent
offense, therefore, the maximum punishment authorized in either of the
cases is a fine not exceeding $50.00 or imprisonment for not more than
30 days.”). A 1967 habitual offender statute permitted jury trial on prior
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conviction allegations be postponed until after guilt on the underlying
offense but continued to require that those allegations be filed, in a
separate information, before trial or plea. See State v. Allen, 233 S.E.2d
585, 588 (N.C. 1977) (“One basic purpose behind our Habitual Felons
Act is to provide notice to defendant that he is being prosecuted for
some substantive felony as a recidivist. Failure to provide such notice
where the state accepts a guilty plea on the substantive felony charge
may well vitiate the plea itself as not being knowingly entered with full
understanding of the consequences. Since the statute makes no
distinction between guilty pleas and jury verdicts of guilt the same
notice requirement prevails in either event.” (citations omitted)). This
procedure continues to be followed today. State v. Hoskins, 736 S.E.2d
631, 632 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (“During the trial on the principal offense,
the defendant’s potential status as an habitual felon on the basis of prior
convictions is not brought to the attention of the jury in considering the
principal offense. If the defendant is convicted on the principal offense,
then the court begins the ‘habitual felon’ phase of the trial and the same
jury determines whether the defendant has attained the status of an
habitual felon.” (citation omitted)).
North Dakota (1889) followed the common law rule on charging
initially. State v. O’Neal, 124 N.W. 68, 69 (N.D. 1909) (highlighting a
state’s attorney’s failed attempt to prove such former conviction); State
v. Markuson, 73 N.W. 82, 86–87 (N.D. 1897) (“[I]t shall be sufficient
briefly to allege such conviction.” (quoting N.D. REV. CODES § 7614
(1895)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In 1927, the state
legislature adopted the supplemental information procedure, permitting
habitual offender allegations to be filed before sentence was fully
executed and to be proven before a new jury. Ryan v. Nygaard, 297
N.W. 694, 698, 701–02 (N.D. 1941). In cases in which the prior
conviction increased the penalty, other than those under the habitual
offender statute, the state courts continued to insist upon inclusion of
prior offender allegations in the complaint, information, or indictment,
as well as proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. State v. Edinger,
331 N.W.2d 553, 555 (N.D. 1983); State v. Ruble, 40 N.W.2d 794, 803
(N.D. 1950). In 1987, the state’s high court held that a written statement
of prior convictions would provide sufficient notice under the Sixth
Amendment and that specific convictions need not be alleged in the
charging instrument. State v. Gahner, 413 N.W.2d 359, 363 (N.D. 1987).
Today, several statutes require prior offense allegations to be included
in the complaint, information, or indictment, see N.D. CENT. CODE
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ANN. § 19-03.1-23(5) (LexisNexis 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.123-11(3) (LexisNexis 2012), or filed prior to plea or trial, see id. § 12.132-09(3)). The state bifurcates jury proceedings for dangerous special
offender cases, but not habitual offender allegations, which are decided
by the judge. Id. § 12.1-32-09(4). Defendants may stipulate to prior
convictions, barring proof before the jury. State v. Tutt, 732 N.W.2d
382, 384 (N.D. 2007).
Ohio (1803) followed the common law rule on charging initially with
increased penalties for subsequent offenders, see Larney v. City of
Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 599, 600–01(Ohio 1878) (“The rule, and the
principle upon which it is founded, are well stated by Mr. Bishop:
‘Where the offense is the first, or is prosecuted as such, the indictment
need not charge it to be the first, for this is presumed. But if it be the
second or third, and the sentence is to be heavier by reason of its being
such, the fact thus relied on must be averred in the indictment; because,
by the rules of criminal pleading, the indictment must always contain an
averment of every fact essential to the punishment to be inflicted.’ See 1
Bish. Cr. L., 6th ed., § 961, and cases there cited. The same rule applies
to an information.” (quoting JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 961 (6th ed. 1877)), and in its first habitual
offender law in the late 1880s, see In re Kline, 6 Ohio C.C. 215, 216–17
(Cir. Ct. 1892) (noting that the previous felonies were charged in the
indictment). It did so until 1987, when it stopped requiring such
allegations be pleaded or proved as elements “where the existence of a
prior conviction enhances the penalty for a subsequent offense, but does
not elevate the degree thereof.” See State v. Allen, 506 N.E.2d 199, 201
(Ohio 1987). Pleading and proof before a jury continues to be required
when the prior conviction elevates the degree of crime. See State v.
Gordon, 276 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ohio 1971) (“[T]he question of a prior
conviction is an essential element of the offense charged, and is an issue
of fact to be determined by a jury.” (quoting Sparkman v. State Prison
Custodian, 18 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. 1944)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); State v. Day, 651 N.E.2d 52, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (“A
prior conviction which raises the degree of a later offense is an element
of the subsequent offense.”); State v. Miller, No. CA2011-02-13, 2012
WL 764907 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2012) (following Day).
Oregon (1859) followed the common law rule on charging from the
outset. State v. Newlin, 182 P. 133, 135 (Or. 1919) (finding “that it was
error to adjudge the defendant guilty of a second offense and sentence
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him accordingly, in the absence of an allegation in the indictment
charging the prior conviction, and this seems to be the general holding
of the courts”); id. at 136 (“[S]uch a sentence was not authorized in the
absence of a proper allegation in the indictment.”). The rule was
codified in 1921 but repealed with the enactment of a new habitual
offender law in 1927, adopting the supplemental information procedure
permitting allegations of prior convictions to be filed after sentencing,
then proved to a new jury. The statute was upheld in 1929. See State v.
Smith, 273 P. 323, 325 (Or. 1929) (citing Graham v. West Virginia, 224
U.S. 616 (1912)); see also State v. Waterhouse, 307 P.2d 327, 332 (Or.
1957) (noting that from 1927 through 1957, even as reenacted and
amended, “the habitual criminal law has provided a post trial procedure
for proving prior offenses”). The state continued to require that prior
conviction allegations be included in the initial charge in cases in which
the legislature had not provided for an alternative procedure. Id. at
332–33. Reacting to the Waterhouse decision, the state legislature
provided in 1961 that all such prior conviction allegations be omitted
from the indictment and proven to the court, a provision upheld against
constitutional challenge in 1963. State v. Hoffman, 385 P.2d 741, 744
(Or. 1963). Today, these allegations need not be included in the
indictment. See State v. Reinke, 309 P.3d 1059, 1060, 1067 (Or. 2013)
(“[T]he facts necessary to impose a dangerous offender sentence [must]
be found by the grand jury and pleaded in the indictment. . . . [T]he
legislature has provided that a prosecutor need not plead sentence
enhancement facts in the indictment. Timely written notice will suffice.
Defendant's constitutional challenge under Article VII (Amended),
section 5, fails.” (internal citations omitted) (citing OR. REV. STAT.
§ 136.765 (2013))).
Pennsylvania (1787) followed the common law rule initially, Rauch v.
Commonwealth, 78 Pa. 490, 490 (Pa. 1875) (“[T]o subject the defendant
to imprisonment it must be charged in the indictment that he had before
been convicted of such offence; the rule applies to misdemeanors as well
as felonies.”); Smith v. Commonwealth, 14 Serg. & Rawle 69, 70 (Pa.
1826), until 1929, when it gave its prosecutors up to two years after a
defendant was sentenced to charge him as a repeat offender and boost
his sentence, see Commonwealth ex rel. Foster v. Ashe, 8 A.2d 542 (Pa.
1939) (citing Act of Apr. 29, 1929, no. 854, § 4 (codified as amended at
19 PA. STAT. § 924)). Section 9714(d) of title 42 of the Pennsylvania
Statutes now vests discretion in the sentencing judge and has been
clearly recognized by Pennsylvania’s highest state court.
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Commonwealth v. Samuel, 961 A.2d 57, 176–80 (Pa. 1943). For other
crimes with higher penalties for subsequent offenses, allegations were to
be included in the indictment, but the prior conviction allegations were
to be kept from the jury, permitting the defendant to decide if and when
convicted, whether to contest them. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155
A.2d 825, 831 (Pa. 1959); Commonwealth v. Orwan, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d
423, 428 (Ct. Quar. Sess. 1959) (“We would add thereto that should the
jury find defendant guilty of one or more of the offenses set forth in the
copy of the original indictments with the averment of prior conviction
deleted, the jury should not be discharged until defendant answers the
rule to show cause. Should he deny his identity as the person formerly
convicted, the question of his identity would then become a jury
question.”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 54 Pa. D. & C. 243, 252 (Pa. Ct.
Quar. Sess., Dauphin Cnty. 1945). Waivers of the right to notice and
proof were also upheld. Commonwealth v. Moses, 271 A.2d 339, 340
(Pa. 1970) (“The lower court lacked the power to impose this enlarged
sentence when the indictment did not contain averments of prior
convictions.”); Commonwealth ex rel. Firmstone v. Burke, 103 A.2d 476,
479 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1954). In 2004, the state’s high court held that
Apprendi’s exception for prior convictions supported the conclusion that
failure to plead and prove to a jury a prior conviction that raises the
maximum sentence does not violate either the federal or state
constitution. Commonwealth v. Aponte, 855 A.2d 800, 811 (Pa. 2004)
(“Where . . . the judicial finding is the fact of a prior conviction,
submission to a jury is unnecessary, since the prior conviction is an
objective fact that initially was cloaked in all the constitutional
safeguards, and is now a matter of public record.”).
Rhode Island (1790) followed the common law rule on charging initially.
See State v. Flynn, 11 A. 170, 171 (R.I. 1887) (construing a statute
punishing “every person who shall have been convicted three times
within a period of six months of intoxication, under such circumstances
as to amount to a violation of decency, or who shall be proved to have
been thus intoxicated three several times within a period of six weeks,
shall be deemed a common drunkard” (quoting Act of 1882, ch. 244,
§ 24, 1882 R.I. Pub. Laws 684, 688) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
It enacted its first habitual offender provision in 1896. By 1956, the
statute permitted the state to bring habitual allegations after sentencing,
to be determined by a judge. State v. DeMasi, 420 A.2d 1369, 1370 (R.I.
1980). Since at least 1983 the state courts have rejected any requirement
to plead the prior conviction allegations in the indictment. See State v.
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Hall, 940 A.2d 645, 660 (R.I. 2008); State v. Sitko, 457 A.2d 260, 262
(R.I. 1983) (noting recidivism allegation must be made before
sentencing). Currently, the statute requires notice be provided “within
forty-five (45) days of the arraignment, but in no case later than the date
of the pretrial conference.” R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-21 (2002 &
Supp. 2013).
South Carolina (1788) permitted increased penalties for subsequent
convictions without allegations in the indictment in 1832. State v. Allen,
42 S.C.L. (8 Rich.) 448, 449 (S.C. 1832) (“If, upon a verdict of guilty, the
solicitor is able to produce the record of a former conviction of the
prisoner for horse stealing, he may move for sentence of death, which
the Court would be bound to pass.”); State v. Smith, 42 S.C.L. (8 Rich.)
460 (S.C. 1832); see also State v. Parris, 71 S.E. 808, 809 (S.C. 1911)
(relying on Smith and Allen and finding that the previous conviction
allegation should have been stricken from the indictment). Such
information had to be included in the indictment when the information
is necessary to establish jurisdiction of the court. Tyler v. State, 145
S.E.2d 434, 435 (S.C. 1965) (“[T]he allegation of the indictment that the
crime charged was a second or subsequent offense was necessary to
show the jurisdiction of the court.”). In 1995, the state’s habitual
offender statute was amended to require notice at least ten days before
trial. Act effective Jan. 1, 1996, 1995 S.C. Acts 568 (discussing
amendment); State v. Burdette, 515 S.E.2d 525, 527 (S.C. 1999).
South Dakota (1889) followed the common law rule on charging
initially, including allegations of prior convictions that raised the penalty
in the indictment. E.g., State v. Kinney, 221 N.W. 250, 250 (S.D. 1928)
(“[A] former conviction is an essential element of the second or
subsequent offense charged as a felony, and, being an essential element
of the crime, must be alleged in the information and proved on the
trial.”); State v. Schaller, 207 N.W. 161, 161 (S.D. 1926) (stating, in a
liquor case, that “[i]t is a well-established rule that, where the statute
imposes an additional penalty for subsequent convictions, the
information upon the subsequent offense should allege the prior
conviction”); State v. Carlisle, 139 N.W. 127, 130 (S.D. 1912) (allegation
included in indictment). Under the 1919 habitual offender act, prior
convictions were alleged in the indictment. E.g., State ex rel. King v.
Jameson, 13 N.W.2d 46, 48 (S.D. 1944); State v. King, 252 N.W. 36, 37
(S.D. 1934). In 1927, the state adopted a version of New York’s habitual
offender statute, permitting a separate, supplemental information to be
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filed after conviction and a sentence on the underlying offense to be
tried to a jury. See State ex rel. Smith v. Jameson, 19 N.W.2d 505, 506
(S.D. 1945); State v. DeMarsche, 1 N.W.2d 67, 68–69 (S.D. 1941)
(finding a greater penalty may not be imposed after initial sentencing if
judge knew of prior convictions at initial sentencing). Other statutes
increasing the degree of offense for defendants with prior convictions
also required a separate “Part II” information charging those
convictions be filed with the initial charge. Black v. Erickson, 191
N.W.2d 174, 176–77 (S.D. 1971) (“Our procedure requires the allegation
of prior convictions to be included in the information charging the
principal offense as Part II thereof. SDCL 23-32-9. . . . [O]ur habitual
criminal procedure ‘satisfies due process by granting an accused timely
and formal notice of the alleged prior convictions before pleading to the
primary charge.’” (quoting State v. Steffenson, 178 N.W.2d 561 (S.D.
1970))). The two-step charging process is still followed, and from 1959
to 2005, the statute required “[a]ny allegation that a defendant is an
habitual criminal shall be filed as a separate information at the time of,
or before, arraignment.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-11 (2006). In
2004, an amendment allowed a judge to grant permission to file after the
arraignment, “but no less than thirty days before the commencement of
trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” Id. The defendant
has a right to a jury determination of the prior offense allegations. Id.
§ 22-7-12 (“The defendant shall also be informed of the right to a trial
by jury on the issue of whether the defendant is the same person as
alleged in the habitual criminal information.”).
Tennessee (1796) followed the common law rule on charging until a
1917 statute provided that the prior conviction required for an increased
penalty for second offense liquor violation need not be alleged in the
indictment. In a 1930 decision, it was upheld as consistent with Graham.
See McCummings v. State, 134 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tenn. 1939); Tipton v.
State, 28 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tenn. 1930). This scheme, however, was
struck down in the federal courts as violating due process by not
providing adequate notice. See Edwards v. Rhea, 238 F.2d 850, 851 (6th
Cir. 1956), aff’g 136 F. Supp. 671, 682–83 (M.D. Tenn. 1955) (finding the
statute fails to provide due process and granting writ of habeas corpus).
Perhaps anticipating this problem, the state legislature in 1950 amended
the statute to require inclusion of prior conviction allegations in the
indictment. See State v. Wyrick, 62 S.W.3d 751, 764 (Tenn. Crim. App.
2001). Thereafter, state court decisions followed the common law rule.
E.g., Warden v. State, 381 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. 1964) (“[W]here a
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statute provides for proof of prior convictions and requires increased
punishment for second or subsequent offenses, the indictment, in order
to charge a second or subsequent offense, must aver not only the
convictions of prior offenses, but also such circumstances of time and
place as to inform the accused of what proofs of prior offenses may be
offered against him and enable him to be prepared to make his defense;
and an indictment failing in these requisites is invalid and a conviction
based thereon is void.”); State v. Sanders, 735 S.W.2d 856, 857–58
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (finding that “[a]n accused, who has been
convicted of driving while under the influence, may not be sentenced as
a recidivist unless his prior conviction or convictions for driving while
under the influences are alleged in the indictment or charging
instrument,” and that it was error for judge rather than jury to find prior
conviction). The state’s habitual offender statute was repealed in 1989.
Judges now find prior convictions at sentencing for multiple, persistent,
and career offenders, and the statute has withstood challenges under
Apprendi, e.g., Morris v. Fortner, No. M2008-01022-CCA-R3-HC, 2009
WL 690304, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2009), but it continues to
require notice of prior convictions that will increase penalty prior to
plea or trial, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-202 (2010). The common law
rule continues to be followed for other repeat offender statutes. See
State v. Cross, 362 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tenn. 2012) (requiring that, for a
subsequent driving under the influence offense, prior offenses must be
alleged in indictment and a bifurcated jury proceeding used, so that if
the jury convicts, it would then be informed of the prior conviction
allegations).
Texas (1845) followed the common law rule on charging, see Long v.
State, 36 Tex. 6, 10 (Tex. 1872) (stating that conviction must be alleged,
citing the commentaries of Joel Prentiss Bishop), and until 2006 Texas
continued to require notice before trial, although it held grand jury
review was not required, Brooks v. State, 957 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). In 2006, state courts upheld notice provided after trial but
before sentencing. See Pelache v. State, 324 S.W.3d 568, 577 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010) (“[F]or purposes of conducting a due-process analysis, the
determination of whether proper notice of enhancements was given
does not require that notice be given within a particular period of time
before trial or before the guilt phase is completed.”); Villescas v. State,
189 S.W.3d 290, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that “due process
does not even require that the notice be given before the guilt phase
begins, much less that it be given a number days before trial” (citing
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Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962))).
Current law requires
“enhancement” allegations to be provided before plea and trial.
Utah (1896) followed the common law rule on charging initially, see
State v. Anderson, 286 P. 645, 645 (Utah 1930); State v. Bruno, 256 P.
109, 110 (Utah 1927) (noting that the state must allege and prove prior
conviction beyond reasonable doubt to convict as persistent violator);
State v. Aime, 220 P. 704, 704 (Utah 1923); State v. Hurst, 205 P. 335, 337
(Utah 1922), and continues to do so today for its habitual offender
statute, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013)
(“The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned,
shall provide notice in the information or indictment that the defendant
is subject to punishment as a habitual violent offender under this
section.”). For other repeat offender enhancements, however, state
courts have held that although pretrial notice is required, a separate jury
finding is not. State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 1978) (firearm
enhancement); State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(regarding the multiple sex offender enhancement: “because the
enhancement is a punishment, it is most reasonable to view these
requirements as coming into play at the sentencing phase of the
prosecution”).
Vermont (1791) courts continue to follow the common law rule. See
State v. Brillon, 995 A.2d 557, 563 (Vt. 2010); State v. Cameron, 227
A.2d 276, 280 (Vt. 1967). The Supreme Court in Apprendi noted that
another opinion, State v. Freeman, 27 Vt. 523 (1855), authorized
increased punishment for violation of a liquor law on proof of prior
convictions without the necessity of pleading them, observing that “the
court did not hold that the prior conviction was not an element; instead,
it held that the liquor law created only minor offenses that did not
qualify as crimes. Thus, the state constitutional protections that would
attach were a ‘crime’ at issue did not apply.” Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 508 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Freeman, 27
Vt. at 527).
Virginia (1788) provided for higher punishment for second offenders in
an act of 1796. See Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738, 746
(1852) (“If any person convicted of . . . a felony . . . shall commit any
such offence a second time, and shall be thereof legally convicted, he
shall be sentenced to undergo an imprisonment in said penitentiaryhouse, at hard labor during life . . . .” (quoting Act of Dec. 15, 1796, ch.
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200, § 24, 1803 Va. Acts 355, 358) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The state initially followed the common law rule. Commonwealth v.
Welsh, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 57, 57 (1817) (reversing sentence because “the
Information in this Case does not state that it is an Information for a
second offense, of retailing spirituous liquors, without license, after
having been before convicted of a similar offense”). But in 1819, the
legislature authorized, as an alternative to the common law procedure,
recidivist status to be alleged and adjudicated after conviction. Rand, 50
Va. (9 Gratt.) at 752–53; Brooks v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. (2 Rob.)
845–46 (1843); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 465, 466
(1825); L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12. Prior conviction
allegations continued to be included in the indictment in second offense
larceny and liquor prosecutions. Toler v. Commonwealth, 51 S.E.2d
210, 214 (Va. 1949); Keeney v. Commonwealth, 137 S.E. 478, 482 (1927);
Kelley v. Commonwealth, 125 S.E. 437, 438 (Va. 1924); Staples v.
Commonwealth, 125 S.E. 319, 320 (Va. 1924); Cooper v.
Commonwealth, 113 S.E. 863, 863 (Va. 1922); Shiflett v.
Commonwealth, 77 S.E. 606, 607 (1913) (“It is well settled that where an
offense is punishable with a higher penalty, because it is a second or
subsequent offense of the same kind, such severer punishment cannot
be inflicted unless the indictment charges that it is a second or
subsequent offense, because by the rules of criminal pleading the
indictment must always contain an averment of every fact essential to
the punishment to be inflicted.”); Pryor v. Commonwealth, 26 S.E. 864,
865 (Va. 1897); White v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 611, 615 (1884); Stroup
v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 754, 754 (1842). As additional
repeat-offense provisions were added, allegations of prior offenses
continued to be required in the indictment.
See Triplett v.
Commonwealth, 186 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Va. 1972) (repeat offense for driving
an automobile while under the influence); Young v. Commonwealth,
156 S.E. 565, 566 (Va. 1931) (same); Sears v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d
274, 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (same); see also Washington v.
Commonwealth, 616 S.E.2d 774, 779–83 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)
(Humphreys, J., concurring) (collecting multiple statutes that make a
prior conviction an element of a greater offense and stating that “this
Court and the Virginia Supreme Court have consistently held that, for a
defendant to be convicted under a recidivist statute, the prior
convictions must be charged in the indictment and proved to the jury”).
Nevertheless, Virginia courts consider this rule subject to change by the
legislature. For example, in 1993, a state court held that, under the drug
statute, prior offenses need not be alleged in the indictment in order to
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impose repeat offender penalties. See Able v. Commonwealth, 431
S.E.2d 337, 341–42 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
Washington (1889) followed the common law rule for its repeat-liquor
violation offense. State v. Dale, 188 P. 473, 476 (Wash. 1920); State v.
Dereiko, 182 P. 597, 598 (Wash. 1919). But in 1903, it adopted the
supplemental information procedure for its habitual criminal law. See
State v. Cotz, 161 P. 1191, 1192 (Wash. 1916); State v. Driscoll, 150 P. 2,
3 (Wash. 1915); State v. Rowan, 146 P. 374, 375 (Wash. 1915); State v.
Miller, 138 P. 896, 899 (Wash. 1914); State v. Le Pitre, 103 P. 27, 28
(Wash. 1909). Even after a revised statute omitted express reference to
the jury trial, it was held that the defendant has a right to jury trial on
the prior conviction allegations. See State v. Furth, 104 P.2d 925, 930
(Wash. 1940); State ex rel. Edelstein v. Huneke, 249 P. 784, 785 (Wash.
1926). The statute was replaced by a three strikes statute in the mid1990s that provided for judicial findings on prior convictions. In
upholding that statute, the state’s high court in a split decision held that,
although state precedent conflicted “regarding whether the habitual
criminals act contained ‘elements’ of a ‘charge’ or was simply a
sentencing enhancement statute,” a jury trial, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and “formal charging” were not “constitutionally
mandated” but that “early notice of the potential sentence” was
“appropriate.” State v. Thorne, 921 P.2d 514, 533–35 (Wash. 1996); see
also State v. Smith, 75 P.3d 934, 942 (Wash. 2003). In 1969, it was held
that when greater penalties followed proof of a prior conviction in drug
offenses, neither allegations in the indictment or proof at trial was
required, even though they were for other facts that raised the penalty.
State v. Nass, 456 P.2d 347, 349 (Wash. 1969).
West Virginia (1863) took with it Virginia’s supplemental charging
procedure that departed from the common law rule when West Virginia
was organized as a separate state. See Graham v. West Virginia, 224
U.S. 616, 623 (1912) (noting that state provisions “were derived
from . . . the Code of Virginia of 1860”); State v. Graham, 69 S.E. 1010
(W. Va. 1910). In 1943, an amendment “provided that the statute
should be invoked only by information filed after conviction rather than
by allegation in the indictment upon which the subject was being
prosecuted for a substantive offense.” See Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448,
451–52 n.5 (1962). A jury decision is still required absent waiver, and,
although the supplemental information may be filed after the initial
sentence, it must be filed in the same term of court as the original
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conviction. See Holcomb v. Ballard, 752 S.E.2d 284, 287–88 (W. Va.
2013) (“[A] trial court is obligated to arraign a defendant on a recidivist
information during the term of court in which the defendant is
convicted.”).
Wisconsin (1848) followed the common law rule on charging for its
repeat-larceny statutes. Ingalls v. State, 4 N.W. 785, 791 (Wis. 1880);
Rolke v. State, 12 Wis. 570, 570 (1860). It followed the same rule for its
repeat-offense liquor statutes as well. See Watson v. State, 208 N.W.
897, 898 (Wis. 1926); Paetz v. State, 107 N.W. 1090, 1091 (Wis. 1906)
(“This doctrine appears to be so well established that we deem
discussion of it wholly unnecessary. The following are some of the many
authorities in support of the doctrine that where the statute provides a
heavier penalty for the second offense, the first must be alleged in the
indictment and proved upon the trial in order to warrant conviction and
punishment for a second offense.” (citations omitted)). Courts required
the prior conviction be alleged before trial in an information before trial
but did not require them to be proven along with other elements at the
preliminary examination. Dahlgren v. State, 157 N.W. 531, 532 (Wis.
1916). Its habitual offender statute required that allegations of prior
convictions be included in the indictment. See WIS. REV. STAT. ch. 193,
§§ 4736–4738 (1878). A defendant had the right to a jury finding of a
prior conviction that increased the penalty. See Green Bay Fish Co. v.
State, 202 N.W. 667, 670 (Wis. 1925).
Wyoming (1890) followed the common law rule on charging initially and
still does. See Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333, 1337–38 (Wyo. 1983)
(“Prosecutors seeking enhanced sentences under the habitual-criminal
statute must bring allegations of habitual criminality under § 6–1–110,
W.S.1977 (see n. 1) in the same information with the underlying felony
charge. . . . [T]he long history of criminal pleading in this state requiring
a single information to charge both the underlying felony and the prior
felonies upon which the State relies to enhance the punishment . . . .”);
Bandy v. Hehn, 67 P. 979, 980 (Wyo. 1902) (“[A]s the fact of a former
conviction enters into the offense to the extent of aggravating it and
increasing the punishment, it must be alleged in the information and
proved like any other material fact, if it is sought to impose the greater
penalty.”).

